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Abstract
The Article raises questions concerning the validity of the age of eighteen years as the youngest
age allowing independent consent of a minor in Israel to his or her medical treatment. One of the
primary suggestions in the Article is that there is a need to apply the informed consent doctrine to
the medical treatment of Israeli and other minors who possess the appropriate capacities deemed
necessary for comprehending the full implication of their consent. The authors believe that the
doctrine of “developing capacities,” as formulated in Article 12 of the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, to which Israel is a signatory and which Israel ratified in 1991, should be
implemented as the major doctrine on the right of a minor to participate in the decision-making
process concerning his/her medical treatment.
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INTRODUCTION
A. New Trends in Israeli Law
The birth of the civil rights doctrine in the modern sense of
the concept dates back to the seventeenth century, to the teach-
ings of the liberal English philosopher John Locke. Locke's
ideas, which were revolutionary at the time, attempted to re-eval-
uate the sources of political power and were founded on the be-
lief that the initial source of political power is the consent of the
governed.'
The post-Second World War era has been distinguished by
an escalation in the status of human rights matters throughout
the world. Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, re-
fers to this phenomenon as the "human rights revolution."2
During this era, human rights issues have been emphasized in
political and legal agendas worldwide. International treaties and
conventions concerning human rights matters have been ratified
by numerous countries, an international court has been estab-
lished, and newly-created constitutions contain sections desig-
nated to ensure and promote civil rights and liberties. The
aforementioned "human rights revolution" and the new legal at-
mosphere surrounding it have been reflected in the Israeli legal
system.
A new normative system of rights has recently developed in
the State of Israel. It is founded on liberal approaches to human
rights issues and focuses on the right to autonomy, privacy, free-
dom, and the right to preserve one's physical well-being. These
fundamental rights were formulated by the Supreme Court prior
* Professor of Law, University of Haifa, Israel. I would like to thank Mrs. Levy
Rinat for her assistance.
1. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1955) (1690).
2. AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAw III: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
261 (1994).
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to the legislation of the new Basic Laws,' but were further em-
phasized with their enactment.
In 1992,; the' Basic Law:! Freedom of Occupation 4 and Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Freedom 5 ("Basic Laws") were en-
acted, bringing about the "Constitutional Revolution in Human
Rights."6 The legislation 'of these Basic Laws has brought about a
fundamental change 'in the normative status of freedom of occu-
pation and human dignity and freedom in Israel. Since the ac-
knowledgment of the existence of these rights was in Basic Laws,
the legislator granted a higher normative status to these rights
and elevated them to the level of constitutional rights.
Section 4. of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom
establishes that: "Every persori is' entitled to protection of their
life, body, and dignity."7
An individual's right to protection of his/her life, body, and
dignity is linked directly to the issue of consent to medical treat-
ment. The desire to protect the right to privacy as well as the
right over one's body and freedom of choice concerning his/her
fate has resulted in the establishment of the doctrine of "in-
formed consent" in many countries, including Israel.8 The pri-
mary purpose of this doctrine is to ensure that an individual is
free to make choices concerning his/her personal destiny, his/
her life, and his/her well-being, including the issue of his/her
medical treatment. The informed consent doctrine protects the
patient's autonomy and maximizes his/her ability to choose.
This new doctrine is basically contrary to the paternalistic
approach to medical treatment, according to which the doctor
and other, persons are more competent in obtaining and
3. See A. RUBINSTEIN, THE'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 711 (1991)
4. Basic .Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992) (Isr.) [hereinafter Freedom of Oc-
cupation Law], available at 26 ISR. L. REv. 247 (1992). This law is also available at http:/
/www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOhjO.
5. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992) (Isr.) [hereinafter Human Dig-
nity Law], available at 26 ISR. L. REV. 248 (1992). This law is also available at http://
www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hiO.
6. C.A. 94/1908, 3363, Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal et al., (1995) 49(4) P.D. 221,
353 (author's trans.).
7. Freedom of Occupation Law, supra note 4, § 4.
8. On this doctrine, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-
84 (1984). On the doctrine in' some common law legal systems (Australia, Canada, and
Great Britain), seeJ. KENYON MASON & R. ALEXANDRA MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL
ETHICS 111-25 (1983); Margaret A. Somerville, Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent,
26 McGILL L.J. 740 (1981).
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processing the medical information and diagnosis, and are
therefore entitled to make choices regarding a patient's treat-
ment. This paternalistic approach is not consistent with the lib-
eral civil rights revolution, which places individual rights and lib-
erties at the center.
The informed consent doctrine received recognition by the
Israeli legislator when the Patients' Rights Law, 5756-1996' ("Pa-
tients' Law") was enacted. Section 13(a) of this law establishes
that: "No Medical treatment shall be given to any patient, unless
he gave his informed consent to it under provisions of this Chap-
ter."10
The informed consent doctrine does not apply to all pa-
tients.11 Israeli case law as well as legal scholars and the Israeli
legislator all acknowledge the existence of cases in which it is
impossible, or problematic, to obtain a patient's informed con-
sent. For instance, the informed consent doctrine does not ap-
ply to an unconscious patient, or a patient suffering from severe
mental disorders.
B. Including Minors in Decision-Making Process Concerning their
Medical Treatment
The issue of including minors in decisions concerning their
medical treatment raises conflicting interests and rationales. On
the one hand, the law in many countries, including Israel, re-
flects a new international trend of growing recognition of the
minor's civil rights. This new trend is an inseparable part of the
general human rights revolution mentioned above, which ac-
knowledges the autonomy of children, views every human being,
including minors, as a separate human entity, and attempts to
protect his/her freedom of choice. Medical treatment enforced
on minors without their informed consent, in instances where
the age and maturity of the minor justify the obtaining of such
consent, is unjustifiable within the framework of this liberal
human rights-oriented approach.
On the other hand, it is claimed that the burden of deci-
9. Patients' Rights Law, 5756-1996 (Isr.) [hereinafter Patients' Law].
10. Id. § 13(a).
11. For cases where the doctrine does not apply, see KEN MASON & R. ALEXANDRA
MCCALL SMITH, BUTrERWORTH'S MEDICO-LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 121 (1987). For the re-
striction of adult rights, see James E. Birren & Wendy L. Loucks, Age Related Change and
the Individual, 57 CHI KENT L. REv. 833, 833-50 (1981).
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sion-making, especially in the context of medical treatment,
should be shifted from the child to the parent, to the legal
guardian, or to the doctor, in order to protect the minor from
self-inflicted harm. Minors are generally presumed to be vulner-
able due to their lack of worldly experience and insufficient
skills in the decision-making process. 12 It is society's duty to pro-
tect children from their own decisions, thereby promoting their
interests. In addition, there is reluctance to bestow on a minor
the responsibilities of adult decision-making. 3
Perhaps due to this claim the human rights revolution
seems to have had minimal effect in the area of minors' consent
to medical treatment in many countries, including Israel. The
legislators in these countries hold that minors are usually incapa-
ble of intelligent and mature consent to medical treatment.
Professor Redding explains: "Children traditionally have
been treated as second-class citizens, viewed by our society and
in our courts as incapable of mature decision-making."14
Such reasons are used to justify a conservative, paternalistic
approach to consent to medical treatment of all minors, which
may also be termed the "best interest" or "welfarist" approach.
One of the main purposes of this Article is to raise questions
concerning the validity of the age of eighteen years as the young-
est age allowing independent consent of a minor in Israel to his/
her medical treatment. One of the primary suggestions that will
be raised here is that there is a need to apply the informed con-
sent doctrine to the medical treatment of Israeli and other mi-
nors who possess the appropriate capacities deemed necessary
for comprehending the full implication of their consent. We be-
lieve that the doctrine of "developing capacities," as formulated
in Article 12 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child,15 to which Israel is a signatory and which Israel ratified in
1991, should be implemented as the major doctrine on the right
12. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88J. CRIM. L. & CIUMINOLOGY 137, 164 (1997) ("In
general, the fact that adolescents have less experience than adults seems likely to affect
decision-making in tangible and intangible ways.").
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent to Mental
Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695 (1993).
15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter
Convention].
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of a minor to participate in the decision-making process con-
cerning his/her medical treatment.
We devote special attention to Israeli law, but we also pro-
pose that this doctrine may be used within the framework of
other legal systems, such as English and American law. These
legal systems could reassess some paternalistic legal rules and
doctrines which still exist within their legal framework. Article
12 of the Convention16 should be the main source of inspiration
when legislators, or the courts, decide on the relationship be-
tween minors and their parents, guardians, doctors, nurses, etc.
I. THE RIGHT OF A MINOR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: THEORETICAL BASIS
When we attempt to address the issue of children's right to
participate in the process of decision-making concerning their
medical treatment, in the first stage of this Article it is imperative
to clarify the differences between the main approaches of cur-
rent law to the legal status of children; namely to compare the
paternalistic "best-interest of the child" principle with the con-
cept of "children's rights," which seems to be an alternative to
the "best-interest" principle in an effort to grant more individual
autonomy to minors.17 These two opposing approaches may be
viewed as offshoots of the "welfarist" and "liberationists" schools
of thought.
16. Id. art. 12. Article 12 states:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the
child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body,
in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
Id.
17. See THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (Michael Freeman & Philip Veer-
man eds., 1992); LAURA PURDv, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 21-54 (1992); John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children's Rights,
OXFORDJ.L. STUD. 161 (1986). Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A FrameworkforAnaly-
sis, 12 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 255, 282 (1979).
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A. The Rationale of Restricting the Rights of Minors: Paternalism
and the Welfarist Theorists
For centuries, children were considered little more than
chattel, subject to the often tyrannical and unrestricted rule of
their fathers. Male heads of patriarchal societies were free to do
as they wished with their children, and sometimes even to pun-
ish them by death for grave disobedience.'" The domestic status
of children reflected the political status of adults: both were sub-
ject to totalitarian regimes that could-and often did-dictate
their every move. Not until the twentieth century could one
comfortably assert that children had special legal rights; previ-
ously, at best, they had special protections.
It is not surprising, therefore, thatJohn Locke, in his revolu-
tionary Second Treatise of Civil Government, felt the need to address
the sources of parental power as part of his re-evaluation of the
sources of political power.19 Just as political power derives from
the consent of the governed, so too parental power derives from
the need children have to be cared for and educated during the
limited period of their minority. As one of the founders of lib-
eral political thought, Locke sought to limit parental power, and
in doing so he recognized the humanity of children. However,
like other early liberal thinkers Locke did not view children as
individuals that can act in an autonomous manner, but believed
it was proper that adults should make decisions on their be-
half.20 What was important for Locke, rather, was the leap to
viewing children as separate human beings, deserving proper
18. See Eekelaar, supra note 17, at 161. See also 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN-
FAMI'LY LAW SERIES (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1984); Martha
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, in CHILD
LAW--PARENT, CHILD AND THE STATE 59 (Harry D. Krause ed., 1992).
19..LocKE, supra note 1, at 141-54. See also Edmund Leites, Locke's Liberal Theory of
Parenthood, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON
PARENTHOOD (Onora O'Neil & William Ruddick eds., 1979).
20. Leites, supra note 19, at 142-43; See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David
Spitz ed., 1975).
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only
to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of
children or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of
manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken
care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against
external injury.
Id. at 13-14. Mill applied this reasoning to members of what he referred to as "back-
ward races" or civilizations that he deemed unprepared for liberty. Id. at 14.
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treatment. Locke and the welfarist view concerning children
and their needs had much in common: both emphasized adults'
obligations to treat children well, and both de-emphasized the
issue of children's autonomy.
This welfarist approach formed the basis of the "best-inter-
est of the child" principle, utilized in the jurisdictions of many
countries in the twentieth century, including Israel. This princi-
ple establishes that decisions must be made on behalf of chil-
dren. The "best-interest of the child" principle views children as
small human beings whose interests must be considered sepa-
rately. It recognizes the limited authority of parental rule and
aims to find the solution that will maximize the welfare of the
child. As will be shown later, it is a paternalistic principle that
shifts the burden of decision-making from the child to the rele-
vant adult-such as a parent, guardian, State employee, or
judge, who makes decisions for children in their best interests.21
The welfarists argue that the reasons for limiting the legal
capacity of minors are quite plausible and justified. They hold
that it should be virtually accepted by all that children simply
may not exercise the right to vote and/or to be elected. The
basic premise behind the notion of curbing the rights :of chil-
dren is the duty and responsibility to pr otect them-even *from
their very own actions and decisions. This is predicated on the
notion that children are weak and vulnerable, lack worldly expe-
rience, are unable to protect themselves, and are susceptible to
exploitation.
Additionally, it is believed that minors cannot properly at-
tend to their own best interests or exercise the rights conferred
upon them because they have not attained full intellectual and
physical development. 22 Therefore, they cannot act in an auton-
omous manner, or think in a reasonable, logical way, which
would enhance their best interest. This, in a nutshell, is the fun-
21. See Robert H. Mnookin, Thinking About Children's Rights-Beyond Kiddie Libbers
and Child Savers 16 STANFORD LAWYER 24 (1981); see also ANDREW BAINHAM & STEPHEN
MICHAEL CRETNEY, CHILDREN-THE MODERN LAw 77-78 (1993) [hereinafter BArINAM-
CRETNEY]; T. Morag, New Challenges in Defining Childhood and Adulthood in Light of the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child, 44 BITACHON SOZIALI 109-11 (1995).
22. See Morag, supra note 21. This idea is also presented in the conclusions of the
Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum, no. 65: Legal Capacity and Re-
sponsibility of Minors and Pupils (1985).
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damental basis of paternalism regarding including minors in the
decision-making process concerning their fate.
The anxiety of many paternalists that conferring upon the
child an entire array of rights and duties would endanger society
and the child himself or herself, was phrased succinctly by the
American scholar Hafen, who wrote that we should not "aban-
don youth to their rights."23
B. The Relationship Between Rights of Parents Concerning their
Minor Children and Paternalism
Another principle, which prevailed for many decades, and
whose vestiges can still be felt with regard to the restriction of
minors' rights at present, is the doctrine of "parents' rights."24
The concept of parents' rights, in its modern form, is based on
the assumption that in addition to duties vis-d-vis their children,
parents also possess rights. This doctrine has found expression
in Section 15 of the Israeli Capacity and Guardianship Law,
5722-196225 ("Capacity Law"), which uses the terminology
"right" as well as the word "duty" concerning the guardianship of
parents, the natural guardians.26
Professor Pinchas Shifman explains:
Although we stress the duties of parents, we may not deny
their rights. Parents' right to raise their children is a basic,
natural right, whose importance cannot be exaggerated.
Nonetheless, this right does not by any means render chil-
dren their parents' property; rather, it expresses the vital and
23. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reser-
vations About Abandoning Youth to Their 'Rights', 3 BYU L. REV. 605 (1976).
24. See S.L. Brackshaw, Health Care of Children Over Objections of the Parents: Clash of
Rights, MED. LAw 221 (1983); K-B. Tavolaro, Effectively and Efficiently Protecting Children
in Faith Healing Cases: A Proposed Statutory Revision for State Intervention, MED. LAW 311
(1991). See also A. Bainham, Growing Up in Britain: Adolescence in the Post-Gillick Era, in
PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY (John Eekelaar & Peter Sarcevic eds., 1993).
25. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, 16 L.S.I 106, 106-18 (Isr.) [hereinafter
Capacity Law].
26. The Capacity Law states:
The guardianship of the parents shall include the duty and the right to
take care of the needs of the minor, including his education, studies, voca-
tional and occupational training and work, and to preserve, manage and de-
velop his property; it shall also include the right to the custody of the minor,
to determine his place of residence and the authority to act on his behalf.
Id. § 15.
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natural bond which exists between parents and their children
* . .Perhaps the most accurate formulation of this concept is
that parents are entitled to fulfill the duty of parenting. A
philosophical approach which views all matters through the
prism of "children's best interests" while overlooking any
other factor is too simplistic and artificial.2 7
The logic of this idea is that only if parents have rights,
which enable them to exercise discipline and guidance over the
actions of their children, can they actualize their right to raise,
educate, and influence the lives of their children. As the legal
capacity granted to children is greater, so the parents' ability to
exercise authority over their children diminishes. In the triangu-
lar relationship of the child-parent-State, when the State bestows
legal capacity on children it is at the expense of the parents'
rights, and consequently the parents' standing in this triangle is
weakened.28
Moreover, another rationale for limiting children's rights is
based on the fact that parents.are liable for the actions of their
children.29
C. Children's Rights Doctrine and Liberal Children's Rights Theorists
The "best-interest of the children" approach has been con-
trasted with the autonomy-oriented approach. The most radical
representatives of the latter doctrine, such as Farson,3 ° writing in
the 1970s, advocated treating' children exactly like adults and al-
lowing them to make their own decisions.31 They argued that all
children are not only separate individuals, they are also autono-
mous human beings who have rights. Therefore, paternalistic
treatment of all minors is unjustifiable within a liberal frame-
work. 2
While today few embrace this somewhat extreme approach,
27. PINCHAS SHIFMAN, 2 FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 219-20 (1989) (author's trans.).
28. See Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits,
in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21 (1983). Melton argues that the State con-
sciously made a value judgment and decided that protecting the family institution takes
precedence over children's rights.
29. See Penal Law, 5737-1977, at § 323 (Isr.). See also A. COODE, THE LAW OF THE
INDIVIDUAL-AcCORDING TO AGE AND SEX (1968).
30. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1978).
31. For more on Farson's point of view, see P.E. VEERmAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD 134 (1992).
32. See also BAINHAM-CRETNEY, supra note 21, at 77.
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and while some scholars hold that no serious thinker could re-
ally advocate complete autonomy for all children,3 more moder-
ate versions of this approach, such as those of Eekelaar and Free-
man, 14 have widely emerged.
Sometimes these more moderate versions of this approach
are based upon Ronald Dworkin's Rights Theory. According to
Dworkin,3 5 while rights may be, in fact, simple correlatives of ex-
isting, duties applied to others, fundamental rights are something
more than that-a moral alternative to utilitarianism. A funda-
mental right overrides utilitarian calculations of social good. It
is not merely an interest protected by the imposition of some
duty on another, but an overriding moral interest which deserves
protection.36
Rights are fundamental, according to Dworkin, where they
are necessary to protect one of the two basic notions-human
dignity and equality-and any theory of rights that fails to ac-
count for these very basic and very powerful ideals is inade-
quate.37 But why should the concepts of human dignity and
equality require the recognition of personal decision-making au-
tonomy as a fundamental right, and why should they require
that this right be extended to children?3 8 For Dworkin, it is im-
possible to respect equality and dignity without also respecting
autonomy, and consequently this point of view repudiates pater-
33. Id. at 79.
34. See Michael Freeman, Taking Children's Rights More Seriously, 6 INT'LJ.L. & FAM.
52 (1992) [hereinafter Freeman-Children's Rights]; Eekelaar, supra note 17, at 162;
John Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children have Rights, 6 INT'L J.L. & FAM.
221 (1992) [hereinafter Importance of Thinking]; Michael Freeman, The Limits of Children
Rights, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 17 [hereinafter Freeman-
Limits of Children's Rights].
35. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi-Xii (1978).
36. Like Dworkin, John Eekelaar seeks to go beyond the formalistic conception of
rights, whereby rights are mere correlates of obligations. Embracing a version of the
will theory of rights, Eekelaar rejects the interest-based welfarist approach. A person
can be said to have a right, he argues, only when he has the power to make a claim that
he can enforce or decide to waive. To say that adults have the obligation to advance
children's welfare is to say nothing at.all with regard to the question of children's rights,
unless the child is recognized as having an autonomous claim. Interests determined by
society, and regarding which obligations are imposed on others, are not rights at all. See
Importance of Thinking, supra note 34, at 228-31.
37. Freeman-Children's Rights, supra note 34, at 63.
38. Professor Freeman criticizes Dworkin for failing to include autonomy along-
side equality and dignity as the basic values that justify the recognition of fundamental
rights. Id. at 64.
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nalism 9
Dworkin views personal autonomy, at least in terms of an
individual's right to choose his/her goals, as inherent to human
dignity and equality.40 For Dworkin, therefore, a rights theory
that fails to account for individual autonomy in this sense would
be a contradiction in terms and would betray its very own foun-
dations.41
Dworkin's emphasis on equality, -together with his recogni-
tion of autonomy as an integral part of his basic system of rights,
also forces us to grapple with how we justify the rules of various
legal systems that differentiate between adults and children with
regard to autonomy. Indeed, the very topic of "children's rights"
can be said to be a contradiction in terms. Recognizing an indi-
vidual as a rights holder means, first and foremost-according to
the Dworkinian theory of rights-recognizing that person's
human dignity. Talking about people, as members of groups,
children and adults, rather than as individuals who should be
evaluated separately on the basis of their own merit, is among
the most fundamental violations of the principles of equality and
human dignity. It is well known that children, vary tremen-
dously. Saying, "children are all alike" is no better and no more
useful than saying: "forty-year olds are alike."
This problem can be solved by an approach that differenti-
ates between children whose rational capabilities are and are not
adequately developed. Children whose decision-making capabil-
ities are comparable to those of adults-regardless of their
39. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 484-87 (1989)
[hereinafter Dworkin-Liberal Community].
40. Freeman adopts a liberal Dworkinian approach to rights. Rights, he claims,
help to ensure that children will not become victims, and that their interests are not
replaced by utilitarian calculations. See Freeman-Children's Rights, supra note 34, at 53-
54.
41. Dworkin's approach to autonomy can be contrasted with that of Neil Mac-
Cormick, which seems to be rooted in John Stuart Mill's utilitarian approach to pater-
nalism. See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACVY ESSAYS IN LEGAL
AND POLITICAL PHmLOsOPHy ch. 8 (1982). MacCormick bases his respect for individual
autonomy on the empirical assumption that the individual is generally the bestjudge of
his/her own good. See BAINHAM-CRETNEY, supra note 21, at 82-84. Therefore, Mac-
Cormick finds it relatively easy to deny children autonomy, given that children, empiri-
cally, are often not the best judges of what is good for them. If, on the other hand,
autonomy is viewed as constitutive of one's good, it becomes far more difficult to justify
limiting it simply because a person lacks a rational capacity for decision-making. There-
fore, liberal children's rights theorists must search for ways to care for children without
violating their own liberal principles.
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ages-would simply be treated as adults, for all intents and pur-
poses.4 2 In this regard, children who lack legal capacity would
be narrowly defined. They are only those children who at pre-
sent lack the required rational capability.
A far more basic question is yet unanswered. On what basis
and to what extent can required rational capabilities be viewed
as the basis for the aforementioned relevant difference between
the two groups of children? Denying children who at present
lack a certain, required rational capability their right to autono-
mous decision-making presents a problem of equality requiring
careful justification. Given that smarter adults are not given
preference over less gifted ones in terms of the autonomy
granted to them, on what basis can rational capabilities be used
to differentiate children and adults in this regard? Daniel Win-
kler deals with this very question, in a slightly different context.4"
Why should we treat slightly retarded individuals differently, he
asks, on the basis of their limited rational faculties, when we
would never dream of differentiating in like manner between
normal and gifted adults? .No one suggests appointing gifted
adults to run the affairs.of other normal adults who have trouble
making sound self-regarding decisions. Why, therefore, does so-
ciety view itself as justified-or even obligated-to run the affairs
of the mildly retarded? The answer, he concludes, lies in the
way competence is defined. The issue is one of competence
rather than intelligence, and that competence is a quality pos-
sessed in equal measure by all those who have it.44 If X intelli-
gence is required to do task Y, then X would be the required
level of competence. Normal and gifted people, both of whom
have at least X intelligence, are equally capable of performing
task Y. The gifted person's "added power is simply unused sur-
plus." This answer justifies a new policy concerning the com-
petence of children. X intelligence, which is required to do a
42. John Stuart Mill wrote: "Neither one- person, nor any number of persons, is
warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his
life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it." MILL, supra note 20, at 71 (em-
phasis added).
43. Daniel Winkler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, in PATERNALISM 84 (Rolf
Satorus ed., 1983).
44. Id. at 87.
45. Id.
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certain task, should be the required level of competence of chil-
dren.
D. Justified and Unjustified Paternalism
Joel Feinberg explores the issue of when and how the State
is justified in interfering in the lives of individuals, whether to
protect them from self-inflicted harm, or to guide them towards
their own good. He attempts -to. reconcile "our general repug-
nance for paternalism with the reasonable nature of some pater-
nalistic regulations."46 ,
Feinberg differentiates ."weak paternalism," from "strong pa-
ternalism.47 He holds that "strong paternalism" is unacceptable.
The strong anti-paternalistic thesis is, as he puts it, that fully vol-
untary choice or consent of a mature and rational human being
concerning matters that affect the individual's own interests is
such a precious thing that no one else (and certainly not the
State) has a right to interfere with it simply for the person's "own
good."48
Some actions create a presumption that the person so
choosing to act must not be acting voluntarily, in the full, ra-
tional meaning of the word. "Patently self-damaging" behavior
would be an example of behavior creating this kind of presump-
tion.4 9 According to his theory "weak paternalism" is possible in
appropriate circumstances:, the State :has the right to prevent
self-regarding harmful conduct when but only when it is substan-
tially non-voluntary or when temporary intervention is necessary
to establish whether it is voluntary or not.5"
Feinberg does not deal with the voluntary nature of the acts
46. Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALiSM 3 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983).
47. Feinberg discusses the example of a woman who wishes to ingest a powerful,
harmful drug. In the first instance she denies factually that the drug is harmful-this is
the quintessential "non-voluntary act"-for the woman does not wish to ingest a harm-
ful drug. She is simply factually mistaken about the nature of the drug she wishes to
take. See id. at 10. In the second instance the woman says she is aware of the dangerous
nature of the drug, but insists that she wants to take it. Here the presumption of non-
voluntariness comes into place: if she can prove her act to be truly voluntary, she ought
to be allowed to proceed. In the third instance the woman says she is indifferent to
physical harm, and explains that the short-term pleasure as a result of the drug is worth
the risk involved. Here, the reasonableness of the risk taken will determine the extent
to which the presumption of non-voluntariness of action is activated. See id. at 9-12.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 9.
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of certain classes of people who a priori are thought to be partic-
ularly susceptible to non-voluntary behavior, in the rational
sense. Can children who as yet lack rational capacity be defined
as individuals whose actions are necessarily suspect, or in rela-
tion to whom a more exacting standard of voluntariness would
be applied? Although Feinberg does not address this issue, it
seems that most liberal children's rights theorists accept in prin-
ciple that such children can be subject to a more intensive ver-
sion of "weak" paternalism. They would agree that young chil-
dren, who are not emotionally mature, can be subject to this ver-
sion of paternalism.
Gerald Dworkin analyzes the character of paternalism. He
divides paternalistic interferences into "pure" and "impure"
cases. In "pure" paternalism the class of persons whose freedom
is restricted is identical with the class of persons whose benefit is
intended to be promoted by such restrictions. In the case of
"impure" paternalism in trying to protect the welfare of a class of
persons we find that the only way to do so will involve restricting
the freedom of other persons besides those who are benefited.5'
He holds that what justifies applying paternalism to chil-
dren is the fact that they lack some of the emotional and cogni-
tive capacities required in order to make fully rational deci-
sions. 2 However, children that do not lack these capacities
should not be subject to paternalism.
Gerald Dworkin held:
The easiest cases to handle are those which can be ar-
gued about in terms which all thought to be so important-a
concern not just for the happiness or Welfare, in some broad
sense, of the individual, but rather a concern for the auton-
omy and freedom of the person. I suggest that we would be
most likely to consent to paternalism in those instances in
which it preserves and enhances for the individual his ability
to rationally consider and carry out his own decisions. In all
cases of paternalistic legislation there must be a heavy and
clear burden of proof placed on the authorities to demon-
strate the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial
51. GERALD DWORKIN, PATERNALISM, FROM MORALITr AND THE LAW 111 (1971).
Dworkin explains: "Paternalism then will always involve limitations on the liberty of
some individuals in their own interest, but it may also extend to interference with the
liberty of parties whose interests are not in question." Id.
. 52. Id. at 118-19.
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consequences) to. be avoided (or achieved) and the
probability of their occurrence. I suggest a principle of the
least restrictive alternative. If there is an alternative way to
accomplishing the desired and without restricting liberty, al-
though it may involve great expense, inconvenience, etc., the
society must adopt it."
E. Theoretical Conclusion,
The aforementioned theories concerning rights, autonomy,
and paternalism, lead to similar conclusions regarding the right
of a minor to participate in the decision-making process. These
principles are applicable also concerning the relationship be-
tween the State, court, guardians,. including natural guardians,
and minors.
While welfarists attempt to formulate a rights approach that
allows for paternalism, liberationists embrace a liberal rights ap-
proach that emphasizes autonomy and attempts "to confine pa-
ternalism . . . without totally eliminating it."54 The significance
of the idea of rights is that children are entitled to make moral
claims and to demand that which they deserve. Liberal rights
theory focuses on listening to children. Only when it is abso-
lutely impossible or unreasonable to respect the child's auton-
omy can society-or parents-intervene. Children are to be
minimally guided and encouraged to produce genuine endorse-
ments of their own. Liberal thinkers try to encourage children
to think for themselves. This approach allows children to speak
for themselves. It grants children that are able to decide the
right to participate in the decision-making process.
We have noted that liberal rights advocates believe auton-
omy to be an essential part of their philosophy of rights. We
have observed that for Dworkin due respect should be given to
human dignity and equality. We have seen that liberal rights ad-
vocates regard enhancement of the individual's ability to ration-
ally consider and implement his/her own decisions more rele-
vant and acceptable criterion -than paternalism, especially
"strong" paternalism. Paternalism is not desirable when an alter-
native way exists to accomplish the desired end. We should ac-
complish the desired end regarding children without restricting
53. Id. at 125-26.
54. Freeman-Children's Rights, supra note 34, at 67.
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liberty. 5 These should be the guidelines in the sphere of con-
sent of minors to their medical treatment.
II. CURRENT ISRAELI LAW
A. Israeli Legislation
1. The Capacity Law
The relationship between parents and their minor children,
in the rules of the main Israeli law concerning the legal capacity
of children, the Capacity Law, is paternalistic. In general the pa-
ternalistic attitude, whose aim is to protect the minor and other
vulnerable individuals from their own decisions, is the basis for
all the rules of Capacity Law. In his commentary on the Capacity
Law, Professor Izhak Englard56 writes that the purpose of the
rules of the Capacity Law regarding minors is to protect the mi-
nor due to his/her feeble intelligence which impairs the minor's
decision-making process.
Some Israeli scholars have noted that the unequal and pa-
ternalistic format of the Capacity Law and its aim to protect cer-
tain individuals may be inferied from the very name of the law
(Capacity and Legal Guardianship). One of the meanings of the
Hebrew word for Guardianship, as found in the law's title-apo-
tropsoot-is paternalism.58
The definition of minority and majority in Section 3 of the
Capacity Law, which establishes the age of legal capacity as eigh-
teen years, is relevant also concerning matters mentioned in
55. See Dworkin-Liberal Community, supra note 39, at 484-87; Joel Feinberg, Legal
Paternalism, 1 CAN.J. PHIL. 105, 111-24 (1971).
56. Currently an Israeli Supreme Court Justice.
57. See IzHAK ENGLARD, CAPACITY AND GUARDIANSHIP LAW, 5722-1962, § 1-13 (Com-
mentary on Laws Relating to Contracts-Founded by G. Tedeschi) 49 (1995). Englard
notes that:
the central idea behind the fundamental concept of the capacity to perform
legal acts as established by the Capacity Law is the concern for a person's abil-
ity to formulate his/her will by means of executing proper judgment. The
Law's sole objective in restricting the capacity of certain individuals is to pro-
tect the performer of a legal act from his/her own act. Hence, the existence
of legal capacity is contingent upon the personal attributes of the performer
(maturity, sanity, etc.).
Id.
It seems that in Englard's view, the aim of rules in regard to the Capacity Law is to
protect the minor from his/her act.
58. D. FRIEDMAN & N. COHEN, 2 Corrriacrs (HEBREW) 1009 (Tel Aviv, 1991).
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other sections of the Capacity Law that bear on the involvement
of the minor in decisions affecting him or her.
Section 4 of the Capacity Law establishes that: "Legal acts of
a minor require the consent of his representative. Consent may
be given in advance or subsequently, for a particular act or for a
particular class of acts. The representative may withdraw his
consent as long as the act has not been performed."59 Moreover,
Section 5 of the Capacity Law establishes that:
A legal act of a minor performed without the consent of his
representative may be voided
1. By his representative or, if he has no representative, by the
Attorney-General, within a month after the act has come to
the knowledge of the representative or the Attorney-Gen-
eral, as the case may be;
2. If the act has not come to the knowledge of the represen-
tative of the Attorney-General-by the minor, within a
month from his attaining full age.60
Section 6 of the Capacity Law establishes that:
A legal act of a minor of a kind commonly performed by mi-
nors of his age, or a legal act between a minor and a person
who neither knew nor ought to have known that he was a
minor, may not be avoided under section 5 even if performed
without the consent of the representative of the minor, unless
substantial harm to the minor or his property was caused
thereby.6
1
Moreover, it seems, that the Capacity Law does not grant due
weight to the minor's desires. Section 44 states that:
The Court may, at any time, on application of the guardian or
of the Attorney General or his representative or of an inter-
ested party, or of its own motion, issue directions to the
guardian in any matter relating to the carrying out of his du-
ties. The Court may also, on the application of the guardian,
approve an act performed by him.6 2
The Court, the Attorney General, or an interested party,
may also be involved in this decision-making process when they
are granted authority that stems from their status according to
59. Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 4.
60. Id. § 5.
61. Id. § 6.
62. Id. § 44.
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Sections 68 and 69 of the Capacity Law. Involvement of a wel-
fare officer is also possible. He or she can apply his/her author-
ity mentioned in Section 70 of the Capacity Law.
The general rule, in Section 68(a) of the Capacity Law,
states:
The Court may, at any time, on application of the Attorney
General or his representative or of an interested party or of
its own motion, take temporary or permanent measures
which seem to it appropriate for protecting the interests of a
minor, a legally incompetent person or a ward, either by ap-
pointing a temporary or permanent guardian, or a guardian
ad litem, or otherwise. The Court may also do so on applica-
tion of a minor, the legally incompetent person, or the ward
himself.6"
The authority is granted to the court. The minor does not
have to participate in the decision-making process in such mat-
ters, nor does he or she necessarily have the legal right to do so.
The court may act on application of the minor.
From the sections cited above, it can be concluded that gen-
erally, in the rules of the Capacity Law, a minor is unauthorized
to independently perform legal acts in various areas, including
expressing his/her consent regarding his/her medical treat-
ment. According to the Capacity Law, the medical treatment of
a minor, as well as many other actions, require the consent of
the minor's representative. A special rule in regard to consent
of a minor to medical treatment was enacted in Section 68(b) of
the Capacity Law.
Section 68(b) of the Capacity Law serves as the specific rule
which deals with the powers of the court vis-d-vis the governance
of the decision-making process of medical treatment adminis-
tered to minors:
Where the application is for a direction to perform surgery or
to take any other medical measure, the court shall not issue
the direction unless it is satisfied, on the basis of a medical
opinion, that the measure is necessary in order to protect the
physical or mental well-being of the minor, legally incompe-
tent person or ward.6 4
63. Id. § 68(a).
64. Id. § 68(b). The rule in Section 68 allows the authorized court, which nowa-
days is often the Court of Family Matters, to take any temporary or permanent actions
necessary in order to protect the minor. The Israeli courts have ruled in a few cases
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This rule is paternalistic. The independent right of the mi-
nor, legally incompetent person, or ward, to be involved in the
decision-making process, is not granted recognition. The Capac-
ity Law does not require that a minor be given an opportunity to
express his/her own will and consent to medical treatment. The
viewpoint of the natural guardians, the minor's parents, and
sometimes that of the court, is of greater importance.
The denial of the legal right of children to express their
wishes reflects the general paternalistic approach of the rules of
the Capacity Law. The Israeli legislator expressed his point of
view in the rules of this law, that children are in need of protec-
tion due to their vulnerability, and also that parents must retain
their special task of child rearing. The assumption is that deci-
sion-making about the child's affairs should be entrusted to his/
her "natural guardians"-the parents, who are older and more
experienced, and so will better serve the child's interests than if
he or she were to make his/her decisions himself/herself.
The Capacity Law grants the minor's parents the right to
take part in the decision-making process concerning medical
treatment of their minor child. According to Sections 14 and 15
of the Capacity Law, parents, who are "the natural guardians of
their minor children," have the duty and the right to take care of
the minor's needs. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the
"minor's needs" include medical and health needs.65 Parents
who attend to those needs of the minor are obligated to "act in
the best interests of the minor in such manner as devoted par-
ents would act in the circumstances."66 As mentioned above, the
legislator revealed his position through the intentional omission
of a possible rule granting weight to the minor's desires. Hence,
questions regarding the child's best interests must be answered
by the child's parents, guardian, or the court.
that when the circumstances of the case justify the ruling that the specific requirement
of this law are relevant, the court will implement the rules of this law. Yet, when the
court is not persuaded that the factual basis of the case justifies the implementation of
specific rules, the court will not implement the rules of this specific law, and will prefer
to act within its general authority based upon the rule in abovementioned section 68.
See HARRY BOAZ, LEGAL CAPACITY AND GUARDIANSHIP (Hebrew) 209-18(8) (1994); see also
C.A. 3236/90, Plonim v. Attorney General (1991) 45(3) P.D. 460, 472.
65. See C.A. 5587/97, Attorney General v. Ben Ikar, Minor (1997) 51(4) P.D. 830,
846.
66. Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 17.
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a. Best Interest of the Child
The rules of the Capacity law coincide with other rules of
the Israeli legislator and rules in international conventions that
state that decisions with regard to children, in various spheres,
should be in the best interest of the relevant children.
This welfarist assumption is the general rule in Israel in
many laws concerning the fate of children. In current Israeli leg-
islation the paternalistic principle of the child's best interest is
the main principle that should guide the minor's parents or
guardian when they are required to decide on the child's behalf.
Section 3 of the Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951,67 Sec-
tion 1 (b) of the Adoption of Children Law, 5756-1996,68 as well
as Section 17 of the Capacity Law, obligate parents, the guard-
ian, or the court, to act in a manner that will enhance the child's
best interest. The Israeli legislator also states, in the Welfare
(Procedures in Matters of Minors, Sick Persons and Absent Per-
son) Law, 5715-1955,69 that the Israeli Attorney-General, or his
representative, can act on behalf of a minor, when he believes he
should do so in the best interest of the child. 0
In addition, Israel has signed and ratified the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states in Arti-
cle 3(1):
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, ad-
ministrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest
of the child shall be a primary consideration. 7 1
These regulations and articles grant certain persons, or the
67. Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 L.S.I. 171, § 3 (Isr.). Section 3 states:
(a) The mother and the father jointly are their children's natural guardians;
if one parent died, then the survivor is the natural guardian.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not infringe the power of a compe-
tent Court or Tribunal to deal with matters of guardianship of children-
of their persons, as well as their property-while considering only the wel-
fare of the children.
Id.
68. Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, § I(b) (Isr.). Section 1 (b) states: "An
adoption order and any other decision under this Law shall be made if the court is
satisfied that they are to the adoptee's benefit."
69. Welfare (Procedures in Matters of Minors, Mentally Sick Persons and Absent
Persons) Law, 5715-1955 (Isr.).
70. See id. § 8.
71. Convention, supra note 15, art. 3(1).
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court, a right to decide regarding the fate of minors in their
"best interest."
The paternalistic, welfarist, point of view is evident in addi-
tional Israeli legislation concerning the fate of children. Section
11(A) of the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-196072
states:
Where a welfare officer is of the opinion that a minor is in
need of protection and that he is in immediate danger or that
he requires medical or other treatment which admits of no
delay, he may take any measures which in his opinion are nec-
essary in order to obviate that danger or to provide that treat-
ment even without the consent of the person responsible for
the minor: Provided that a minor shall not be withheld from
the control of the person responsible for him for more than a
week save with the approval of the court.
73
Section 2 of the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-1960
states:
A minor is in need of protection if-
(1) there is no person responsible for him; or
(2) the person responsible for him is not capable of taking
care of him or supervising him or neglects such care or
supervision; or
(3) he has done an act which is a criminal offence and has
not been brought to trial; or
(4) he has been found vagrant or begging or hawking in con-
travention of the Youth Labour Law, 5713-1953; or
(5) he is exposed to any bad influence or lives in a place reg-
ularly used for illicit purposes; or
(6) his physical or psychical well-being is impaired or likely to
become impaired from any other cause; or
(7) he was born suffering from drug addiction.7 4
Some scholars claim that interpreting the term "neglects,"
in Section 2(2), broadly will lead to a greater intervention of the
legal system in the autonomy of the family and will weaken the
status of parents in the family. According to this broad interpre-
tation, whenever parents refuse to grant their minor child medi-
cal treatment they actually could be considered guardians that
"neglect" this child and violate their duty in the above men-
72. Youth (Care and Supervision) Law (5720-1960) (Isr.).
73. Id. § 11 (A).
74. Id. § 2.
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tioned law to care for their minor children and supervise them.
Therefore their son/daughter could be regarded as a "minor in
need of protection."75
2. The Patients' Rights Law, 5756-1996
In 1996, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) enacted the Pa-
tients' Law. 7 6 The rules of this law reflect a shift from paternal-
ism to autonomy with regard to adults, but paternalism remains
concerning minors. This law maintains the paternalistic rela-
tionship between the minor and his/her parents, guardian, doc-
tor, etc., concerning his/her medical treatment.
Section 1 of the Patients' Law states: "The objective of this
Law is to lay down the rights of persons who seek medical treat-
ment or who are under medical treatment, and to protect his
dignity and his privacy."7 7 Chapter 4 of the Patients' Law adopts
the doctrine of "informed consent" in the field of administering
medical treatment.78 According to the doctrine of "informed
consent," the decision of the patient must be informed, includ-
ing information about the risks and benefits of alternative treat-
ments.7 9 The legal standard for informed consent to medical
treatment requires that the consenter be informed, competent,
and acting voluntarily.8°
Section 13 of the Patients' Law establishes that:
(a) No Medical treatment shall be given to any patient,8 1 un-
less he gave his informed consent to it under the provi-
sions of this Chapter;
(b) In order to obtain informed consent, the practitioner
shall give 82 the patient the medical information, which
he reasonably requires in order to be able to decide
75. See A. BEN DROR, THE LAW OF PROTEGES 318 (1998).
76. Patients' Law, supra note 9.
77. Id. § 1.
78. Id. ch. 4.
79. See M.A. McCabe, Involving Children and Adolescents in Medical Decision Making:
Developmental and Clinical Considerations, 21 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 506 (1996).
80. See id. at 506; David .G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness
in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1991). *
81. Section 2 of the Patients' Law defines "patient" as "a sick person and any per-
son who seeks or is under medical treatment." Patients' Law, supra note 9, § 2.
82. Section 2 of the Patients' Law defines "practitioner" as "physician, dentist, in-
tern, nurse, midwife, psychologist and any other professional recognized by the Direc-
tor-General, by notice in Reshumot, as practitioner in the medical services." Id.
THE RIGHT OF A MINOR IN ISRAEL
whether to consent to the proposed treatment.8 3
Section 15 of the Patients' Law sanctions the performance of
non-consensual medical treatment under certain circumstances.
Section 15(2) establishes that:
Under circumstances in which the patient is in severe danger,
and in which he objects to medical treatment which, under
the circumstances of the case, should be provided quickly, the
practitioner may provide the treatment even against the pa-
tient's will, if an Ethics Committee-having heard the practi-
tioner-approved the provision of the treatment, provided it
was convinced that all the following apply:
(a) The patient was given the medical information, as re-
quired, in order to obtain informed consent;
(b) It is expected that the medical treatment will improve the
patient's medical condition significantly;
(c) There are reasonable grounds to assume that the patient
will give his retroactive approval after the medical treat-
ment has been given.
8 4
Generally, the autonomy of the minor is limited. When the
consent of the minor's guardian, may be obtained, it is incum-
bent upon the treating physician to obtain this consent prior to
the performance of medical treatment upon the minor. The mi-
nor's consent is sufficient only in the event that the consent of
his/her guardian or representative cannot be obtained. 5
83. Id. § 13.
84. Id. § 15(2). This rule is in spirit of the principles ofJewish Law. InJewish Laws
the principle of Sacredness of Life is dominant. Therefore it is obvious that the mother
and father do not have a right to risk their child's life and to prevent the treatment by a
doctor which is essential for him or her. See RABBI DAVID ZvI HOFFMAN, 2 RESPONSA
MELAMED LEHOIL, Yoreh Deah, 104. Some Jewish Scholars in the twentieth century
held that when a court determines what the "welfare" of the minor is, it should reach its
conclusion after an investigation of the estimated will of the minor. See RABBI MOSHE
HERSHLER, 2 HALAcHAH AND MEDICINE 122 (1981).
85. The patient's remedy against a physician who violates this duty is a legal suit
based on grounds of breach of legal duty. See Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version),
§63 (1968):
(a) Breach of statutory duty consist of a failure by any person to perform a
duty imposed upon him by any enactment other than this Ordinance, be-
ing an enactment which, on a proper construction thereof, was intended
to be for the benefit or protection of any other person, whereby such
other person suffers damage of a kind or nature contemplated by such
enactment: provided that such other person shall not be entitled by rea-
son of such failure to any remedy specified in this Ordinance if, on a
proper construction of such enactment, the intention thereof was to ex-
clude such remedy.
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The legislator of the Patients' Law consciously chose to not
grant the minor the autonomous right to express his/her in-
formed consent with respect to his/her medical treatment.
It can be inferred that this was the policy of the legislator
regarding the extent of autonomy granted to minors concerning
their medical treatment from the fact that Sections 2 and 15(d)
of the Patients' Rights Bill, 5752-1992 were eventually eliminated
by the legislator and do not appear in the final version of the
Patients' Law.
Section 2(a) of the Patients' Rights Bill prohibited discrimi-
nation with regard to patients' rights by stating: "There shall be
no discrimination among patients on grounds of religion, race,
nationality, or age."86 Notably, Section 4 of the Patients' Law
establishes that: "Practitioners or medical institutions shall not
discriminate between patients because of religion, race, sex, na-
tionality, country of origin, or any other similar grounds.''8 7
As clearly shown, the Patients' Rights Bill specified, among
other things, discrimination on grounds of the patient's age.
However, the Patients' Law did not include age as a potential
ground for discrimination. The deliberate omission of this type
of discrimination from the Patients' Law requires explanation.
Apparently, the legislator indicated, through this omission in the
Patients' Law, his/her opinion that minor patients are not
granted the same rights as adult patients. This discrimination is
manifested, inter alia, by the Patients' Law policy concerning the
minor's right to express his/her consent to medical treatment.
Section 15(d) of the Patients' Rights Bill states:
The informed consent of a minor or of a legally incom-
petent person shall be obtained under the provisions of the
Capacity Law as long as other special provisions are not estab-
Id.
Another legal aspect that should be taken into consideration is that the Israeli
legislation protects rights of privacy. Justices Bach and Beiski held that according to
one possible interpretation of Israeli law, medical treatment that is granted to a patient
without his/her consent is "other nuisance," mentioned in Section 2(1) of the Israeli
law regarding defense of the right of privacy. See C.C. 527, 480/85, Cortam v. State of
Israel (1986) 40(3) P.D. 673, 694-95. However, when the life of a minor can be saved by
an operation, and the parent refuses to approve it without a reasonable justification,
preservation of life should be granted supreme value. This is true especially when it is
not likely that the operation itself will harm or disable the patient.
86. Patients' Rights Bill, 5752-1992 (Isr.) (author's trans.).
87. Patients' Law, supra note 9, § 4 (emphasis added).
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lished in this respect in a different law.8"
The fact that this Section was omitted from the Patients' Law,
again, leads one to the conclusion that the legislator deliberately
did not wish to impart to minors the right of personal autonomy
with respect to the decision-making process regarding their own
medical treatment.
Justice Orr explained, in Attorney General v. Ben Ikar, Mino7s
case:
The fact that the Patients' Law, 5756-1996, does not in-
clude regulations concerning medical treatment of minors is
significant. This law did not abolish old Israeli regulations
concerning minors. One can easily see that the legislator of
the Patients' Law was aware of the fact that there are patients
who have a representative or guardian (Section 15(1) of the
law).
I do not hold that the rules of the new law-the Patients'
Law-abolish the rule in section 68(b) (of the Capacity Law)
concerning medical treatment to minors.
90
3. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom9 1 was enacted in
1992. Since the enactment of this Basic Law, the legal status of
personal autonomy has essentially been elevated to the level of a
constitutional right. This Basic Law applies to all people, regard-
less of their age.9 2 The new constitutional law sets a new agenda:
autonomy should replace paternalism, as much as possible.
Section 2 of the Basic Law establishes: "The life, body or
dignity of any person shall not be violated."9 3 Section 4 of the
Basic Law establishes: "Every person is entitled to protection of
his life, body and dignity."9 Section 5 of the Basic Law states:
"The liberty of a person shall not be deprived or restricted
through imprisonment, detention, extradition, or in any other
manner."95
88. Patients' Rights Bill, supra note 86 (author's trans.).
89. See 5587/97, Attorney General v. Ben Ikar, Minor, (1997) 51(4) P.D. 830.
90. See id. at 845 (author's trans.).
91. Human Dignity Law, supra note 5.
92. See BARAK, supra note 2, at 435.
93. Human Dignity Law, supra note 5, § 2.
94. Id. § 4.
95. Id. § 5.
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It may be argued that in light of the values of human dignity
and freedom, and/or the rights of persons upon their bodies,
that the Basic Law implements the doctrine of informed consent
with respect to the medical treatment of minors.
The Patients' Law, which generally does not grant minors
the right of personal autonomy to express their informed con-
sent to the performance of medical treatment upon them, is a
specific law (lex speciales) enacted in 1996, after the enactment of
the important constitutional law: the Basic Law. Since the pater-
nalistic rule in the Patients' Law regarding consent of minors to
treatment is in dissonance with the provisions of the Basic Law in
this regard, one must refer to Section 8 of the Basic Law which
should be implemented in the event of legislation of a new law,
subsequent to the Basic Law, which includes rules that are in
violation of rights established by the Basic Law.
Section 8 of the Basic Law states:
The rights according to this Basic Law shall not be infringed
except by a statute that befits the values of the State of Israel
and is directed towards a worthy purpose, and then only to an
extent that does not exceed what is necessary.96
Hence, the Patients' Law's denial of the right of informed
consent to minors must be examined carefully in light of the
requirement of the legislator in Section 8 of the Basic Law.
Another important relevant principle is interpretation in
light of the rules of the Basic Law. The paternalistic rules of the
Capacity Law concerning the consent of a minor to his/her
medical treatment were enacted in 1962. However in light of
the Ganimat97 case, the provisions of "old" legislation, which
were enacted prior to the enactment of the recent Basic Laws,
must be interpreted in accordance with the values and rights es-
tablished by the Basic Laws. In the Ganimat case, two schools of
thought, a broad approach and a narrow approach with respect
to the interpretation of legislation enacted prior to the enact-
ment of the Basic Laws, emanated from the different decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court of Israel. According to the
majority opinion in this case, interpretation, in the spirit of the
Basic Law, of an old law enacted before the Basic Law, is re-
quired when it is possible to interpret sections of the "old" law
96. Id. § 8.
97. C.C. 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel (1995) 49(3) P.D. 355, 412-21.
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(including the Capacity Law) in this manner. Justice Barak ex-
plained that this type of interpretation is not judicial legislation.
It is an attempt to find new meanings in old legislation.9 How-
ever, Justice Cheshin, in a minority opinion, held that since the
Israeli legislator stated in Section 10 of the Basic Law that "this
Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law (din) in force
prior to the commencement of the Basic Law," the Supreme
Court should not use the method of interpretation in a manner
that could affect the validity of a law in force prior to the com-
mencement of the Basic Law.99
Consequently, the approach of the majority in the Ganimat
case should be applied regarding medical treatment of minors.
The legal principles of "old" legislation, including the rules of
the Capacity Law that are relevant concerning medical treat-
ment of minors, should be interpreted in the spirit of the new
principles of the Basic Law.
The legislator of the Capacity Law-an "old law", enacted
before the enactment of the "new" Basic Law-did not explicitly
establish a formula which balances the right and duty of parents
to ensure the welfare of their children and the limited right of
their minor children, in Section 6 of this law, to enhance their
independence and personal autonomy.
One can argue that when courts examine what precisely is
included in the phrase "a legal act of a minor of a kind com-
monly performed by minors of his age"100 in Section 6 of the
Capacity Law, it is incumbent upon them to take into account
the values of human dignity and freedom, and grant autonomy
to the minor, as much as possible, in accordance with the mi-
nor's age and level of intellectual maturity. The position of the
minor's parents with respect to his/her medical treatment is not
of sole importance. The proper process of decision-making,
which safeguards the minor's fundamental rights that are
granted to him or her by the Basic Law, is an important consid-
eration that should be taken into account, and is more impor-
tant than granting due weight to the point of view of the parents.
This interpretation, in light of the rules of the Basic Law, should
promote the designed goal of making the rigid legal framework
98. See id. at 414. See also BARAK, supra note 2, at 560-61.
99. C.C. 537/95, Ganimat v. State of Israel (1995), 49(3) P.D. 355, at 388-99.
100. Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 6.
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of the capacity law, concerning the limitation of minors' legal
acts, more flexible. In addition, this interpretation advances the
notion of autonomy of minors. The courts must determine, in
each case, the proper degree of autonomy that may be bestowed
on the minor with respect to medical treatment that affects him
or her.
The Author shares the point of view of Professor Englard
that when one considers what is included in the term in the Ca-
pacity Law "a legal action commonly performed by minors," the
court should grant attention to the dignity and freedom of the
minor. Therefore, not only the general attitude of the parents
towards the character Of the action is important, but the perspec-
tive of the minor is also important. Society should promote his/
her basic right to be treated in a manner that will enhance his/
her human dignity and freedom.
Consequently, the court should grant weight to the idea of
independence of the minor. Therefore, the court should con-
sider the extent of autonomy that should be granted to the mi-
nor in the process of decision-making concerning his/her medi-
cal treatment. °1 Professor Englard held that the original, pater-
nalistic intention of the legislator of the Capacity Law regarding
the purpose of the legislation of this law is not significant nowa-
days. At present, the interpreter of this law should take into con-
sideration the fact that this aforementioned Basic Law was en-
acted and is a source of interpretation of Israeli legislation.1
0 2
Perhaps, the verdict in the Daaka case should also be consid-
ered. Recently, in C.A. 2781/93 Daaka v. Carmel Hospital" 3 case,
the Israeli Supreme Court ruled concerning a thirty-nine-year
old woman, who was hospitalized for a surgery in her left leg.
However, the surgery was performed in her right shoulder, since
there was a medical justification-a fear of severe consequences
as a result of a tumor. The doctors reached the decision that
this change was necessary, without receiving the woman's con-
sent in the required manner. Due to the surgery, her shoulder
was hurt. The court held it was not a case of negligence; how-
ever, there was not a full consent of the patient. The court de-
101. See ENGLARD, supra note 57, at 179.
102. See C.C. 537/95, Ganimat v. State of Israel (1995), 49(3) P.D. 355, at 412-21.
103. See C.C. 2781/93 Daaka v. Carmel Hospital, et al., (1999), 53(4) P.D. 526-624.
THE RIGHT OF A MINOR IN ISRAEL
cided that this violation of the patient's right to consent justified
a verdict that the victim should receive due compensation.
The main origin of the acknowledgment of the right to re-
ceive compensation was the rule that every. person has a funda-
mental right to act autonomously. This right was defined as
"his/her independence, self-reliance and self-contained ability
to decide."' °4 It can be derived from this right that each person
has the freedom that his consent must be given before intruding
on his body.
In the Ganama°5 case, Justice Barak held that the right to
autonomy is one of the main expressions of the constitutional
right of every person in Israel, which is derived from the Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This right was granted to
adults in this case; however, the Israeli Supreme Court granted
the right of personal autonomy to every person, including mi-
nors.
B. International Law
1. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
("Convention") was signed by Israel on July 3, 1990, and ratified
by Israel on August 4, 1991.106 In light of the ratification of the
Convention, one must examine if Israeli law adopted the doc-
trine of including children in the decision-making process on
matters concerning them grounded in the Convention. This
doctrine requires the collaboration of a defined group of minors
in the decision-making process affecting them.
Article 12 of the Convention states:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his or her own views the right to express those views freely
in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child.10 7
104. Id. at 107; Fran Carnerie, Crisis and Informed Consent: Analysis of a Law-
Medicine Malocclusion, 12 Am.J. OF L. & MED. 55 (1986).
105. Bagatz 4330/93, Ganam v. Head of the Bar (1996), 50(4) P.D. 221, 233.
106. See 31 KaVEI AMANA, 1038, at 221 (1991).
107. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12(1). For the historical background to the
legislation concerning children's rights, see GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 45 (1995). For the ratification and the impli-
cations of the Convention in the United States, see Barbara J. Nauck, Implications of the
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The establishment of the principle concerning the right of
the child to express his/her own wishes, in Article 12 of the Con-
vention, is an important innovation which imposes an obligation
upon those whose decisions and actions bear an influence upon
children to take their opinions into consideration.
The social value of the rules of the Convention is evident.
The Convention recognizes the status of the minor as a posses-
sor of rights (and not solely as an object of paternalistic protec-
tion). It establishes that children must be imparted with rights
in accordance with their varying stages of development, and
hence, the legal weight attached to their opinions will be related
to an objective factor, their age, and a subjective factor, their
intellectual maturity. Article 12 enhances the notion that there
is development, or there are stages, in the competency of mi-
nors.
The Convention also provides weight to the child's family
unit and the social-cultural framework wherein he or she resides.
The Convention strives to strike a balance between the recogni-
tion of the minor as a possessor of rights and the need to circum-
scribe these rights in order to promote two values: (1) the
child's best interests;'0 8 and (2) the need to enhance the rela-
tionship of respect and honor between the child and his/her
parents and the autonomy and privacy of parents as the heads of
the family unit.
Are the rules of the Convention binding law in Israel? Cer-
tain articles in the Convention grant minors rights in the sphere
of medical treatment for themselves.' °9 However, they are not
United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Civil
Rights, the Constitution and the Family, 42 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 675, 676-78 (1994).
108. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 3. Article 3 of the Convention establishes
that in all actions performed on behalf of children, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
109. See id. art. 6. Article 6 establishes:
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.
Id. Article 23 states:
1. States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should
enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote
self-reliance and facilitate the child's active participation in the community.
2. States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care and
shall encourage and ensure the extension, subject to available resources, to
the eligible child and those responsible for his or her care, of assistance for
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which application is made and which is appropriate to the child's condition
and to the circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child.
3. Recognizing the special needs of a disabled child, assistance extended in
accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article shall be provided free of
charge, whenever possible, taking into account the financial resources of
the parents or others caring for the child, and shall be designed to ensure
that the disabled child has effective access to and receives education, train-
ing, health care services, rehabilitation services, preparation for employ-
ment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive to the child's
achieving the fullest possible social integration and individual develop-
ment, including his/her cultural and spiritual development.
4. States Parties shall promote, in the spirit of international co-operation, the
exchange of appropriate information in the field of preventive health care
and of medical, psychological and functional treatment of disabled chil-
dren, including dissemination of and access to information concerning
methods of rehabilitation, education and vocational services, with the aim
of enabling States Parties to improve their capabilities and skills and to
widen their experience in these areas. In this regard, particular account
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
Id. Article 24 states:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the high-
est attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness
and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no
child is deprived of his or her right to access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particu-
lar, shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health
care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary
health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition including, within the framework
of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily
available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers
and risks of environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal care for mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, .in particular parents and chil-
dren, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the
use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of
breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the preven-
tion of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family
planning education and services.
3. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-opera-
tion with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right
recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular account shall be
taken of the needs of developing countries.
Id. Article 25 states:
States Parties recognize the right of a child who has been placed by the com-
petent authorities for the purpose of care are, protection or treatment of his
or her physical or mental health, to a periodic view of the treatment provided
to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement.
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binding to the same extent as Israeli internal law. Israel became
a signatory to the Convention, and ratified it; however, it has not
incorporated the rules of the Convention into Israel's internal
law. The official status of the Convention is merely that of a
source of interpretive inspiration and the legal rules in the Con-
vention do not have the status of an enforceable norm in
Israel.a1 °
When a non-profit organization requested that the Minister
of Education not stop the funding of its activity of education of
young children, and mentioned the right of children to educa-
tion in the Convention, the Supreme Court quoted a statement
in an earlier decision:
The provisions of the Convention are not included in the
laws of the State of Israel, rather they constitute international
legal norms.111
Justice Orr explained that:
The persons at hand did not acquire any tangible right on the
basis of the treaty and they cannot actualize such a right in a
court of law as beneficiaries or in any other manner.1 1 2
The Supreme Court held that due to this and other reasons,
the petitioners-the non-profit organization-could not draw
from the Convention the concrete rights which they claimed."1 '
In order to endow the principles of the Convention with the
legal status of internal Israeli law, the Israel Ministry of Justice
presented a proposal of legislation, to be entitled the Rights of
the Child Law, 1995. Ms. Yehudit Karp, Deputy Attorney-Gen-
eral at the Ministry of Justice, explained that the legislator's goal
was that after the enactment of this legislation, this Convention
would serve as the chief source of interpretation in Israel with
respect to the rights of the child and his/her well-being, and this
legislation would infuse the concept of children's rights in Israel
with substantive legal meaning, and would advance social con-
Id.
110. Y. Zilbershats, The Adoption of International Law into Israeli Law: The Real is
Ideal, MISHPATIM, 24 (2) 317, 321-22, 344 (1994).
111. Bagatz 419/83, Doron v. Supervisor of Foreign Currency (1983), 38(2) P.D.
323, 333.
112. C.A. 25/55, Custodian of Absentee Property v. Samara (1955), 10(3) P.D.
1824, 1829.
113. See Bagatz 1554/95, Friends of Gilat, Non-Profit Organization v. Minister of
Education et al., (1996) 50(3) P.D. 2, at 25.
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sciousness to the rights of children.' 14
As of the time of writing this Article, the Israeli House of
Representatives, the Knesset, has not enacted the Rights of the
Child Law. Therefore, the general right of minors to be incor-
porated in the decision-making process concerning matters af-
fecting them, in Article 12 of the Convention, is not recognized
in Israeli internal Law.
However, interpretation can lead to the granting of rights to
minor patents. The informed consent doctrine applies to mi-
nors, as much as possible, as a result of interpretation in light of
the rules of the Basic Law and the Convention.
a. The Combined Criterion: Age and Maturity of Minors
in Israeli Law
The Israeli legislator states that the parents are the minor's
natural guardians."I5 They, de facto, usually decide for him or
her. Are they in the best position to decide concerning his/her
fate due to their close and intimate acquaintance and familiarity
with the matter at hand? The context is important. In areas that
remain under parental jurisdiction, there are situations in which
a contradiction may arise between the parents' interest and the
child's best interests, and their decision will not reflect the
child's best interests. Additionally, even if parents' sole concern
is their child's best interests, one may conclude that were the
children to voice their interests, 'they would be more accurately
met, and therefore, naturally, due weight should be granted to
the children's expressed desires. The right to express their deci-
sion should be granted in accordance with their true compe-
tence.
At present, this is desirable law. The general rule is pater-
nalistic. However, in certain rules in Israeli legislation, parents
are no longer presumed to be the best protectors of their chil-
114. Ms. Yehudit Karp, Israeli Deputy Attorney-General, explained in a letter to
the Israeli Minister ofJustice, of December 27, 1995, that a Basic Law governing funda-
mental social, economic, and cultural rights has not yet been enacted in Israel, hence
the Convention constitutes, inter alia, a statement (albeit a relative one, as it is contin-
gent on available resources) on heightened societal awareness of these fundamental
rights on behalf of the child. The rights to the enjoyment of basic health, education,
and welfare, and their substantive manifestations, are not anchored in an Israeli Basic
Law. At present, the imperative to legislate them, as mandated in the Convention, lacks
the formal normative foundation toward this end.
115. See Capacity Law, supra note 25, §§ 14-15.
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dren's best interests, and at times parents have ostensibly been
stripped of their authority. According to Section 7 of the Adop-
tion of Children Law, 5741-1981,116 an adoption order will not
be granted for a child who is at least nine years old, unless the
court is sufficiently certain that the candidate for adoption wants
to be adopted by the adoptive parents. If the adoptee is younger
than nine, yet the court is under the impression that the child "is
able to understand the matter," an adoption order will only be
made if the court is satisfied that the candidate wishes to be
adopted by the adopter.
Additionally, according to Section 13A(b) of the Capacity
Law, a child that reaches the age of ten may not undergo conver-
sion to another religion without his/her advanced written con-
sent, in addition to his/her parents' consent and consent of the
court. The age of the minor is the relevant criterion. His/her
maturity is not taken into consideration. This rule grants the
minor autonomy to an extent, but is basically paternalistic; the
child's will is essential yet it is not sufficient.
At present, only in specific and special areas, when the legis-
lator holds that it is important that the minor act independently,
the legislator enacts specific and limited legal rules, which grant
the minor the right to decide independently concerning matters
that affect his or her life.
Some of these rules are in the field of medical treatment.
For example, with respect to detection of the AIDS virus among
minors, the law permits a minor aged fourteen years or older to
be the exclusive decider. The examination, requested by the mi-
nor, will be performed without the approval of his/her parents
or guardian. The minor's parents may not intervene in his/her
decision. The Israeli legislator takes into account the minor's
decision-making capability: his/her age and comprehension
level.1 17 The doctor should be convinced, after he or she takes
into consideration the minor's age, his/her emotional maturity,
and his/her ability to form an independent will, that the best
interest of the minor requires an examination without approval
of his/her representative. This rule essentially adopts the princi-
116. Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, § 7 (Isr.).
117. See Law Concerning Detection of the AIDS Virus Among Minors, 5756-1996,
Law Book, 5756-1996, (Hebrew) § 1, at 252 (Isr.).
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pie of developing stages of competency, formulated in Article 12
of the Convention.
Additionally, with regard to the performance of an abortion
on a minor, probably since the intervention of the minor's par-
ents may sometimes place the minor in jeopardy, the Israeli leg-
islator conferred on the minor the exclusive right to make deci-
sions concerning the cessation of pregnancy." 8 In this case the
comprehension level of the minor is not a relevant factor.
Another rule concerning psychiatric treatment, which is an
exception intended to ensure the granting of necessary treat-
ment to minors, grants them more autonomy. The rule regard-
ing psychiatric treatment of minors, in an amendment to the
Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-1960, of 1996, enables
the court to accept the request of a minor aged fifteen years or
older to be hospitalized, or psychiatrically examined or treated,
even though his/her representative does not approve this act.
The age and the level of comprehension of the minor are impor-
tant here. The court must be convinced that the minor under-
stands the essence of this examination.1"' Likewise, for psychiat-
ric hospitalization the law enables the court to consent to the
request of a minor aged fifteen years or older who requests a
psychiatric hospitalization for examination or treatment, even if
his representatives object to the hospitalization. This rule is rele-
vant when the court is convinced that the minor understands the
essence of the examination120
Section 3(4) of the Family Matters Court Law, 5755-1995,2I
grants a minor, in certain circumstances, the right to represent
himself or herself in certain litigation in family matters. This
general rule is one small step in the right direction: granting
more autonomy to minors. However, it is relevant only in cer-
tain circumstances and only in the Family Matters Court.
In all the matters mentioned above, the right to make a de-
cision in appropriate circumstances was granted to the minor
alone. However, it must be stressed that this is not the norm but
the exception. The legislator could also have included other
118. See Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 316(b) (Isr.): "the informed consent to the inter-
ruption of her pregnancy... the consent of a minor does not require the approval of
her representative."
119. See Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-1960 (Isr.).
120. Amendment (1996) of § 3 of the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law (Isr.).
121. Family Matters Court Law, 5755-1995 (Isr.).
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special rules in this departure from the norm, such as rules con-
cerning psychological counseling, drug consumption, and in-
cest. Parents who have conservative beliefs on these issues may
endanger their minor children or cause them harm due to im-
proper treatment of these problems. Consequently, there is a
special justification for conferring on minors the sole right to
make decisions in these sensitive areas in their best interest.
The general rule should reflect the shift from paternalism
to autonomy. All minors who are mature and able to decide on
their own should be granted the right to decide about their fate,
including decisions concerning their medical treatment. The
relevant consideration concerning the capacity of minors should
be the doctrine of "developing capacities," as formulated in Arti-
cle 12 of the Convention, which states:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his/her own views the right to express those views freely
in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child.1 22
The attempt of the legislation in these sections in Israeli law
to grant minors more autonomy should not be an exception to
the general rule. An amendment of the Capacity Law, and other
legislation concerning the fate of children, which will enhance
autonomy of minors and reduce paternalism, is necessary.
C. Interpretation of Law
1. Interpretation of the Capacity Law
Some scholars are of the opinion that certain provisions of
the Capacity Law enable a minor to participate in the decision-
making process concerning his/her medical treatment. They
hold that the source of the Israeli doctrine of informed consent
to medical treatment performed on minors who are capable of
comprehending the possible risks and dangers of the medical
treatment they should receive is grounded in Section 6 of the
Capacity Law.123 This Section states that a legal act of a minor of
a type commonly performed by minors of a certain age cannot
122. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12.
123. See A. Oltzwaler, Consent of a Minor for Medical Treatment (Hebrew), 14 REFUA
U'MISHPAT 23, 26 (1996).
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be annulled by the representative of the minor, although this act
has been performed without the consent of this representative,
"unless substantial harm to the minor or to his/her property was
caused thereby.1 124
However, this interpretation of Israeli law-that this Section
is relevant concerning the consent of minors to medical treat-
ment-is far from being universally accepted. In the past, the
Israeli Supreme Court interpreted the phrase in Section 6 of the
Capacity Law "a legal act of a minor of a kind commonly per-
formed by minors of his age. 125 It did not hold that this phrase
grants the minor an independent right to consent to medical
treatment. In the opinion of Justice Ariel, in the Shefer case, it is
incumbent upon the parents to represent the interests of their
minor child concerning his/her medical treatment. 26 The role
of the representative of the minor is important.
It is not easy to harmonize between the general commercial-
economic trend of Sections 4-6 of the Capacity Law and the spe-
cific rule concerning medical treatment in Section 68(b) of this
Law. Section 6 of the Capacity Law establishes an exception to
the general rule-an act which is commonly performed by mi-
nors of the said minor's age, may not be voided by the minor's
representative. 127 However, this arrangement was primarily de-
signed to handle regular commercial transactions. The issue of
medical treatment is of a special nature since consequences
stemming from the minor's consent are not limited to the com-
mercial domain. They have direct repercussions on the criminal
and tort liability of the doctor with regard to the actual perform-
ance of the treatment and its outcome. 12' Therefore, according
to Professor Englard, the rules of the Capacity Law applied in
124. Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 6.
125. Id.
126. C.A. 506/88, Shefer (minor) v. State of Israel (1994), 48 (1) P.D. 87, at 198-
99.
127. See Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 6. Professor Englard wrote that the main
purpose of the first requirement of this section is the protection of the other partici-
pant of the legal transaction with a minor. He also held that the burden of proof that
the legal act is valid is imposed on the person relying on this phrase. This is proven by
showing evidence of the practice of performing such actions by minors who do not ask
for their parents' permission before they perform the act. In addition, the person rely-
ing on this phrase has to prove that the performance of such actions is a phenomenon
that is known to many parents, and they do not usually oppose to the performance of
such actions. See ENGLARD, supra note 57, at 98-100.
128. Non-consensual medical treatment in Israeli law constitutes an assault. Penal
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matters of medical treatment performed on minors cause a great
degree of uncertainty with regard to the validity of the minor's
consent, and hence place a heavy burden on the doctor's shoul-
ders.1 29
Indeed, the main question does not revolve around the eco-
nomic aspects of the agreement between the treating doctor and
the patient. The key issue is the autonomy of the latter versus
the interests and rights of his/her parents. The rule concerning
medical treatment, in Section 68(b) of Capacity Law is not a full
comprehensive regulation of the relevant rights and duties of all
parties to consent to medical treatment. The current legal ar-
rangement, as mandated by all relevant rules of the Capacity
Law, does not create the necessary modus operandi for balancing
competing interests. Nor does it distinguish between regular,
commercial, or medical matters, and special urgent matters,
such as crucial decisions concerning life and death.
The legislator of the Capacity Law was primarily concerned
with the legal acts performed by minors in the economic sphere.
The commercial-economic approach of the Capacity Law, in Sec-
tions 4-6, does not provide the proper framework for the legal
regulation of the special, very sensitive issue of a minor's consent
to medical treatment. The minor himself or herself is some-
times capable of performing the act of consenting to medical
treatment, yet, as we have seen, under the current law, the gen-
eral rule states that the parents are authorized to retroactively
void the minor's consent.
We can conclude that the rules of Capacity laws in regard to
minors are paternalistic. It seems that according to the current
law one cannot find in Section 6 of the Capacity Law the source
Law, 5737-1977, §§ 378, 379; Civil Wrongs Ordinance, §§ 23 (assault), 35 (negligence),
63 (breach of statutory duty).
Section 9(b) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance states that a minor, who is less than 18
years old, can sue when he/she holds that the rules of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance were
violated. Therefore, although the minor cannot consent to the treatment, he can sue
when he was harmed and holds that a suit based upon the cause of assault is justified.
When the minor cannot consent to medical treatment, his/her guardian can con-
sent. The Israeli Supreme Court, in C.A. 2781/93, Daaka v. Carmel Hospital, (1999), 53
(4) P.D. 526, granted compensation as a result of the fact that consent of a patient to
medical treatment was not granted, and harm was caused. In this case, the autonomy of
the individual was granted recognition as an independent right, and the breach of this
right justified compensation. The rule is also relevant with regard to consent of a mi-
nor or his/her legal representative.
129. See ENGLARD, supra note 57, at 49-51.
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of the Israeli doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment
performed on minors who are capable of comprehending the
possible risks and dangers of this medical treatment
2. Medical Treatment: Paternalism
The courts in Israel try to determine, in each case, accord-
ing to the relevant circumstances, whether the parent, represen-
tative, or guardian, who consents or does not consent to medical
treatment is acting in the best interest of the minor or of the
retarded person.
Prior to the legislation of Section 68(b) of the Capacity Law
a paternalistic point of view that granted little (if any) impor-
tance to the personal autonomy of a minor patient prevailed in
Israeli Case Law.
Justice Agranat ruled 3 ° that the refusal of the parents of a
minor to authorize the lifesaving operation of amputating their
daughter's leg constituted a breach of their duties as guardians
of the minor child that should enhance her well-being. He held
that they were not acting in the best interest of their daughter.
The doctors held this operation was a matter of life and death.
Therefore, the Court granted due importance to the preserva-
tion of the minor's body and life.
After the enactment of the Capacity Law, in the case of At-
torney General v. Ploni, TM ' the Supreme Court challenged the issue
of authorization of a lower court of a kidney donation from a
mentally retarded person, with the status of limited capacity.
The purpose of this donation was a transplant of the kidney into
the body of the retarded person's father, who raised him. The
judgment of the Supreme Court established that Section 68(b)
of the Capacity Law empowered the court to approve certain
medical measures that although not medically necessary for the
minor or for the retarded protected citizen, are intended to
have a positive impact upon this person's mental and/or general
health. Among these measures is the removal of an organ from
the body of this person for the purpose of transplantation, on
condition that the benefit of the organ donation for his/her
mental and/or general health will be "to an immeasurable de-
gree" greater than the harm which will be caused as a result of
130. C.A. 322/63, Gerty v. State of Israel (1964), 18(2) P.D. 449.
131. R.A. 698/86, Attorney General v. Ploni et al. (1998) 42(2) P.D. 661.
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the donation. This is a paternalistic attitude, which attributes
great importance to the view of the court concerning measures
that enhance the physical and mental health of the patient, and
less importance to his/her autonomy.
In the case of Association in Favor of the Right of the Citizen to
Decide Concerning His Life. v. Ziv Government Hospital, Safed,132 the
District Court Judge, E. Matza, t 33 held, that Section 15 of the
Capacity Law did not grant the parents the right to request that
certain life saving medical treatment should not be granted to
their daughter, at the final, painful, stage of her fatal illness, the
Tay-Sacs disease."' He held that Section 15 of the Capacity Law
does not grant them, as representatives of the minor, authority
to request this termination of medical treatment. His outlook
was paternalistic. He emphasized the obligation of natural
guardians, in Section 17 of the Capacity Law, to act in the mi-
nor's best interest. 13 5
In the court decision Shefer (Minor) v. State of Israel,136 the
Supreme Court discussed the right of a natural guardian to deny
medical treatment to his/her minor child in his/her custody.
The court analyzed the nature of the right and obligation of the
parent to act on behalf of his/her minor child as a natural
guardian. It held that this right and obligation includes the
right to deny medical treatment, although the refusal to consent
to this treatment may lead to the death of the minor.1 37 How-
ever, a decision of this nature requires the authorization of the
court.138 The doctor is relieved from his/her obligation to treat
132. O.M. 779/88 (Tel-Aviv), Association in Favor of the Right of the Citizen to
Decide Concerning his Life v. Ziv Government Hospital, Safed, P.S.M. (1988-1989) (2),
at 240.
133. At present a Justice in the Supreme Court of Israel.
134. See O.M. 779/88 (Tel-Aviv), Association in Favor of the Right of the Citizen to
Decide Concerning his Life v. Ziv Government Hospital, Safed, P.S.M. (1988-1989) (2),
at 247-48.
135. The same policy could be also applicable with regard to the Attorney General,
since the duty to act in the best interest of the minor is relevant in certain cases con-
cerning the Attorney General, who is responsible for the public's welfare. See Capacity
Law, supra note 25, § 69.
136. C.A. 506/88, Shefer (minor) v. State of Israel, (1994) 48(1) P.D. 87.
137. Active Euthanasia is forbidden in Israeli Penal Law. Penal Law, 5737-1977,
§§ 300, 302, 309(4), 378. The Shefer case, supra note 126, focused upon the option of
Passive Euthanasia. The dilemma was whether the doctor has any obligation to
lengthen the patient's life, against his/her will.
138. In the Shefer and Gerty cases, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the guardi-
anship of parents includes the right to refuse to medical care, even if the refusal would
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the minor only after the court approves explicitly the policy of
not granting treatment to the minor. In the Shefer case, the Is-
raeli Supreme Court ruled that in certain circumstances the de-
cision to deny a minor medical treatment may be perceived as a
breach of the parental obligation to act "in the best interest of
the minor in such manner as devoted parents would act in the
circumstances."139 The decision may also be considered a viola-
tion of the parent's obligation of protecting the minor's body
and mental health. The court's point of view was paternalistic.
It granted authorization concerning medical treatment and ac-
ted on behalf of the child in her best interest. The Supreme
Court held that the court was empowered to grant such an au-
thorization since the Israeli legislator stated, in Sections 68(b)
and 44 of the Capacity Law that the court can decide regarding
these matters. Justice Elon held in the Shefer case that Jewish
Law is an important source of inspiration concerning these bio-
ethical matters. His paternalistic outlook in the Shefer case was
based upon the adoption of the supreme principle in Jewish
Law-the holiness of life, as well as other principles ofJewish law
such as the value of preventing suffering of patient and the rule
of loving your fellow man.
In the Shefer case, the court held that the minor's life was of
value, her dignity was upheld, and she was not suffering. Given
this reality, Justice M. Elon ruled that the sanctity of life should
be the decisive value. 140 The minor's life must be preserved, and
all harm or hindrance to it is contrary to the values of the State
of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State.
The paternalistic point of view in the Shefer case is contrary
lead to the death of the minor; but a refusal of this kind is considered justified only
after receiving the approval of the court. This refusal could be considered unjustified
when the court considers it a violation of the parents' duty to act "in the best interests
of the minor in such manner as devoted parents would act in the circumstances." Ca-
pacity Law, supra note 25, § 17.
139. C.A. 506/88, Shefer (minor) v. State of Israel, (1994) 48(1) P.D. 87.
140. In general, the practitioner has an obligation in the law to grant any medical
treatment to a patient that he treats. Patients' Law, supra note 9, § 11; Penal Law, 5737-
1977, § 322. And yet, the extent of the practitioner's duties to grant medical treatment
to a patient have not been clarified in Israeli legislation, since the law acknowledges, in
certain circumstances, the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. The person's
right not to get physically hurt without his/her consent -means, among other things,
that a person is entitled not to go through any medical procedure that naturally hurts
the body without his/her consent. C.A. 3108/91, Raybi et al. v. Weigel et al., (1993)
47(2) P.D. 497. 505-06, 512-13.
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to the view of scholars that emphasize the value of granting au-
tonomy to a suffering patient. According to Gerald Dworkin,
there are several reasons for favoring physician-assisted suicide:
(1) the interest of the dying patient that the process of dying will
be as painless and dignified as possible; (2) his interest in deter-
mining the time and manner of his death; and (3) enhancement
of autonomy and relief of suffering.'41 Advocates in favor of eu-
thanasia argue that patients ought to have the right to take their
own lives, or, if they so desire, to be put peacefully to death by a
physician. 4 2 On the other hand these advocates would probably
hold that there are special exceptions. 14 3
The principle of personal autonomy to choose, which is
mentioned in Dworkin's writing, is not adopted in the Shefer
case. Perhaps there could be exceptions to the verdict in this
case. Paternalism in the Shefer case might be a result of the pa-
tient's young age, which prevented the possibility of granting
due weight to her will and informed consent.
In the case of the Attorney General v. Shani,144 the court ex-
amined the legal validity of a minor's consent to a bone marrow
donation. An eight-year old minor donated bone marrow for
the purpose of saving his six-year old sister, who faced a "clear
and certain" danger of death. Judge Dorner'4 5 decided that due
to the great psychological tension that the minor was liable to
encounter in his relationship with his family, as a result of the
minor's refusal to donate bone marrow, a judicial refusal to au-
thorize the donation was likely to cause a great mental blow to
the child, while at the same time, the medical risks of a bone
marrow transplant were quite slim in light of the body's regener-
ation of bone marrow. The judge, therefore, authorized the
medical procedure. This is a continuation of a paternalistic ap-
proach that imparts little importance to personal autonomy.
The Ploni v. The Welfare Officer case 4 6 involved an adoles-
cent, aged seventeen years and seven months, who suffered from
141. GERALD DWORKIN ET. AL., EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-AssISTED SUICIDE, FOR
AND AGAINST 3 (1998). See also Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, HAST-
ING CENTER REP., 19 Special Suppl. 22-30 (1989).
142. DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 110.
143. Id.
144. C.C. Jerusalem, 349/90, 90(2) Takdin-District, 482.
145. Currently a Justice of the Israel Supreme Court.
146. See Bagatz 2098/91, Ploni v. Welfare Officer Jerusalem et al. (1991), 45(3)
P.D. 217.
THE RIGHT OF A MINOR IN ISRAEL
cancer. The minor's parents implored their son to undergo
chemotherapy but he refused to accept the treatment out of fear
of the accompanying pain and suffering. To avoid this treat-
ment he ran away from home. The minor was eventually located
by the police, and the juvenile court which ruled concerning the
matter ordered that the medical treatment, chemotherapy, be
forcibly administered to the minor at the psychiatric ward, for
coerced treatment may be administered only in the psychiatric
ward. 14 7 The minor petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court, the
High Court of Justice, and requested that it should order the
cessation of these forced treatments. The court did not decide
the exact balance between the will of the minor and the will of
his parents, his natural guardians, which requested he should
undergo chemotherapy in his best interest, since the circum-
stances were as follows:
We had the opportunity to speak at length with the peti-
tioner and to stress before him the importance and grave ne-
cessity of chemotherapy for treating his illness, the high
chances of being cured, and his personal responsibility to ful-
fill the supreme commandment of "you shall protect your
lives" (Deuteronomy 4:15). Towards the end of our ex-
change of words, the petitioner informed us that indeed his
initial desire was to refuse to undergo the treatments due to
the pain they would cause him; however, he has now con-
sented to obey the court order concerning the treatments for
the entire duration of the order, and he has promised to ap-
pear in the medical institution in order to receive the treat-
ments. Thank You! After conducting this heart to heart dis-
cussion with the petitioner, we are convinced, to the best of
our abilities of understanding, which the petitioner spoke to
us truthfully. The petitioner is indeed a minor and only near
the age of legal adulthood, yet, when taking into account his
appearance before us, his manner of speech, and his sincer-
ity, we deem him to be an adult and that his words are genu-
ine ... This suffices us, so we do not hold there is a necessity
to delve into the legal questions at hand that were raised
before us which touch upon the fundamental values of
human liberties, on the one hand, and the individual's best
interests on the other hand, and the balance between these
147. According to Joel Feinberg, soft or weak paternalism justifies intervention in
self-regarding conduct, which may properly be defined as non-voluntary (because of
distortions caused by ignorance, compulsion etc.). See Feinberg, supra note 46, at 3.
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competing values. 14
8
The court reasoned that this approach was the ideal solu-
tion for resolving this specific case. The Justices felt that the pe-
titioner spoke truthfully and therefore did not delve into rele-
vant legal questions. The young man was not granted the legal
right to make a decision regarding his medical treatment since
he was a minor. However, the epilogue to this story was not as
rosy as the judges anticipated. The petitioner fled abroad, and
when his condition worsened he returned to Israel, where he
died shortly afterwards. The minor did not justify the trust of
the justices. However, it must be added that the justices who
spoke to the minor held "we deem him to be an adult," and that
had the petitioner been a few months older, the matter would
surely have not been decided by a court. The justices did not
grant him rights of an adult but took into consideration the fact
that he was almost an adult who can decide his own fate autono-
mously.
The general rule is that every person in Israel, including a
minor, has the right to receive medical treatment, or to refuse
medical treatment or medical examination, in suitable circum-
stances, provided only that there is no legal order demanding
the performance of that treatment or examination.149 In suita-
ble circumstances the court can render that medical treatment
should be granted to a minor or an adult. 150
When the court decides whether to enforce the treatment,
it should compare the benefit of the treatment with the possible
harm that could be caused to the minor. Only when the ex-
pected benefit of the treatment is greater than the possible harm
that can be caused by it, the court will be able to state that the
medical treatment is required for the minor, and the court will
enforce its performance. 51  This rule is flexible and unde-
fined.15 2 The court is careful, and analyzes each case in light of
its particular circumstances. It also takes into consideration the
values of society.
148. Bagatz 2098/91, Ploni v. Welfare Officer Jerusalem et al. (1991), 45(3) P.D.
217, at 219 (author's trans.).
149. See 548/78, Sharon et al. v. Levy, (1989) 35(1) P.D. 736, 755.
150. See 480/85, Cortam v. State of Israel, (1986) 40(3) P.D. 673.
151. See R.A. 698/86, Attorney General v. Ploni, (1988) 42(2) P.D. 661, at 689.
152. See Case 5587/97, Attorney General v. Ben Ikar, Minor, (1997) 51(4) P.D.
830, at 847.
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The general trend is evident. The minor or retarded per-
son is not an independent, autonomous, human being, who has
a right to decide concerning his/her own fate. Others decide
concerning his/her medical treatment in his/her best interest.
3. Age and Maturity of Minors in Israel: Case Law
Sometimes the relevant principle is paternalistic, namely
the best interest of the child,"' but the court holds that the in-
dependent wishes of the child should be taken into considera-
tion, in his/her best interest.
Israeli courts recognize the right of a minor to be involved
in the decision-making process under certain circumstances with
respect to child custody. It is customary to take the child's opin-
ion into consideration regarding his/her preferable custodian
beginning from age ten or eleven and older, when the child pos-
sesses sufficient understanding and discretion to form a respon-
sible opinion with regard to custody and visitation arrangements
that optimally serve his/her best interests.154 Israeli courts tend
not to force a child, after reaching the age of ten or eleven, to be
153. See Capacity Law, supra note 25, §§ 24-25. Section 24 states:
Where the parents of the minor live separately-whether the marriage has
been annulled or dissolved or still exists-they may agree between them as to
which of them shall exercise the guardianship of the minor, wholly or in part,
which shall have custody of the minor and what shall be the right of the other
parent with regard to having contact with him. Such an agreement shall be
subject to the approval of the Court, and upon such approval shall, for all
purposes, other than for the purpose of an appeal, have the effect of a judg-
ment of the Court.
Id. § 24; Section 25 states:
Where the parents have not reached an agreement as provided in section 24,
or where they have reached an agreement but it has not been carried out, the
Court may determine the matters referred to in section 24 as may appear to it
to be in the best interest of the minor provided that children up to the age of
six shall be with their mother unless there are special reasons for directing
otherwise.
Id. § 25.
154. This Israeli legislation includes the phrase: "in the best interests of the mi-
nor." The age of maturity is not mentioned. It was the courts that specified a particular
age of maturity of the child at which he or she is deemed able to understand all the
relevant considerations in custody cases. See A.H. Shaki, Rethinking Parental 'Right' of
Custody, 9 TEL Aviv UNIV. L. REv. 59 (1983) [hereinafter Rethinking Parental 'Right];
A.H. Shaki, Main Characteristics of the Law of Child Custody in Israel, 10 TEL Aviv UNIV. L.
REv. 5 (1984) [hereinafter Main Characteristics];Y. RONEN, INCLUDING THE CHILD IN CUs-
TODY DECISIONs 34-46 (1997).
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in the custody of a guardian against his/her will.155 They take
into consideration not only the child's age but also individual
subjective factors, such as the intensity of the child's determina-
tion and his/her mental development, which enables him or her
to discern and judge in a proper manner. However, this policy
does not stem from an attempt to grant minors more autonomy:
it is paternalistic. The welfarist point of view leads to the conclu-
sion that this rule is necessary in order to prevent placement of
the child in an undesirable environment and consequently sad-
ness and stress.1 56
Many writers have focused on the doctrine of Israeli courts
that consider the wishes of some minors (e.g., in custody dis-
putes) as the most important practical result of adopting a chil-
dren's rights approach that emphasizes autonomy. 57 After all,
what could be more respectful of autonomy than, as Eekelaar
put it, actually listening to what the child has to say? Listening,
however, is not enough: the very fact that there is someone who
must listen and the fact that the child does not make his/her
decisions independently, serve to emphasize the child's depen-
dence. The real question is whether the child's input has a deci-
sive effect in the outcome. In practice, the opinion of the pro-
155. SeeJustices Olshan, Zilberg, and Vitkon in Bagatz 89/52, Levi v. The Head of
the Execution by Court Officer, Jerusalem (1952) 6 P.D. 1264, 1265;Justice Cheshin in
Bagatz 39/55, Bar v. Bar, (1955) 9 P.D. 1367, 1370-71;Justices Sussman and Cheshin in
C.A. 241/57, Paltiel v. Paltiel, (1959) 13(1) P.D. at 599, 604-05, 606-07; Justices Kister
and Kahan in Bagatz 391/71, Plonit v. Almoni, (1972) 26(1) P.D. at 85, 99, 102-03;
Justice Cohn in C.A. 653/72, Yahalomi v. Yahalomi, (1973) 27(2) P.D. 434, 441-44;Jus-
tice Kister in C.A. 433/67, Tzabar v. Tzabar et al., (1969) 22(1) P.D. 162, 166-67;Justice
Ben-Ito in C.A. 352/80, Tzukerman v. Tzukerman, (1980) 34(4) P.D. 689, 694; Justice
Netanyahu in C.A. 687/83, Mazor v. Mazor, (1984) 38(3) P.D. 29, 36; Justice Beiski in
C.A. 113/89, Mazar v. Kavilio, (1989) 43(1) P.D. 661, 666-67; Main Characteristics, supra
note 154, at 33.
156. The obligation to take into consideration the wishes of the child, at a suitable
age, stems from the interpretation of the obligation in Section 25 of the Capacity Law,
to enhance the best interest of the child. The court will not want to distress the child
and cause unnecessary emotional stress and harm. Therefore, it will tend not to rule in
a manner contrary to the child's feelings and wishes. See C.A. 424/70, Yelin v. Yelin 2
5(1) P.D. 172, 173 (1971); Rethinking Parental 'Right, supra note 154, at 78-81; RONEN,
supra note 154, at 121-31.
157. Many scholars have emphasized that independent counsel, in child custody
disputes, is the most important expression of any recognition of children's rights. See,
e.g., Emile Kruzick & David Zemans, In the Best Interests of the Child: Mandatory Indepen-
dent Representation, 69 DENV. U.L. REv. 605 (1992); Shannan Wilber, Independent Counsel
for Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349 (1993); Linda Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Dis-
putes: The Time is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53 (1992).
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fessional experts such as social workers and psychologists is more
important than the child's opinion.
Is Article 12 of the Convention, which includes the phrase
"in accordance with the age and the maturity of the child, "158 a
binding legal rule in Israel? At present Israeli proposals of legis-
lation are intended to enhance children's rights in Israel. One
proposal is intended to elevate the legal status of the Convention
to the level of internal Israeli law. An additional proposal sug-
gests that the legislator will explicitly mandate all State authori-
ties to uphold the rights of the child as delineated by the Con-
vention.159 As of the time of writing, the Israeli legislator has still
not adopted these proposals as valid legislation. However, in
light of the ratification of the Convention by Israel, all Israeli
State organs are bound by the Convention as long as its princi-
ples do not clash with the principles of internal Israel law.16° If
and when such a conflict arises, the paternalistic point of view of
domestic legislation-such as the rules of the Capacity Law and
the Patients' Law-is preferred to the principles of the Conven-
tion that grant more autonomy to the minor. 161
As mentioned, only in a few specific areas, such as adoption,
does the Israeli legislator state that the court should take into
consideration the wishes of minors. In general, despite having
ratified the Convention in 1991, Israel has not yet enacted any
general legislation explicitly adopting the children's rights doc-
trine. The best interest of the child principle and paternalistic
rules of the Capacity Law remain at the core of most decision-
making with regard to minors, regardless of their ages.162 The
custom in the field of child custody is based upon one criterion:
an age differentiation between children-younger and older
than ten or eleven years old, with all the paternalism it implies.
It does not take into account the specific maturity level of the
child.
It is important to remember that the courts are obligated to
interpret the domestic legislation concerning minors in light of
the rules of the Basic Law and the Convention. The channel of
158. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12.
159. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 85-115 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part II.A.1 of this Article-The Capacity Law, and subsection
II.A.l.a-Best Interest of the Child.
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interpretation of the Capacity Law and the Patient Law in light
the principles of this Convention should lead to the conclusion
that minors should be granted more autonomy, including the
right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
their medical treatment, when these principles do not clash with
the principles of Israeli internal Law, such as the principles of
the Capacity Law and the Patients' Law.
4. Children's Rights in Israeli Case Law
Despite this lack of substantial legislative progress in the di-
rection of the introduction of a general rule in internal Israeli
law that adopts the principles of the abovementioned Conven-
tion and the doctrine of children's rights, some effort has been
made to place the concept of children's rights on the legal
agenda in Israel in decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court.
In the landmark Ploni, Minor v. Ploni case, 163 the former
Chief Justice, Shamgar-facing a conflict between parents re-
garding the religious education of their children-discussed the
importance of utilizing rights discourse in making decisions re-
garding children. He differentiated between the best interest of
the child principle and the concept of children's rights. Sham-
gar attempted to present the new agenda-children's rights-as
a remedy for the shortcoming of the best interest of the child
principle. However, Shamgar, without addressing the issue di-
rectly, adopted an interest-oriented approach to children's
rights that devalued autonomy. In doing so, he failed to formu-
late a children's rights approach that truly improves upon the
best interest of the child principle. As his analysis shows, the
formula he applied is based upon a narrow definition of rights,
so he was unable to live up to his own stated goal.
In the Ploni case, the wife decided to become aJehovah Wit-
ness. The District Court issued an order, on request of the hus-
band, forbidding the wife to expose her children to her activities
and beliefs as a member of the Jehovah Witnesses. The wife ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower court order
violated the freedom of religion of herself and of her children.
Appealing to Article 14 of the Convention, the mother argued
that her freedom of religion included her right to impart her
religious values to her children, and that their freedom of relig-
163. C.A. 2266/93, Ploni, Minor v. Ploni, (1995) 49(1) P.D. 221.
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ion, protected by the Convention, included their right to learn
about the principles of the religion of their parents.
164
Portraying the dilemma as a triangular one, involving the
State, the parents, and the child, Justice Shamgar held that chil-
dren, regardless of the current legal validity of rights mentioned
in the Convention, possess constitutional rights according to Is-
raeli internal law. 165  Like all fundamental rights, children's
rights are not absolute and must be balanced against competing
interests and rights. 166
Shamgar divided children's rights into two categories: gen-
eral constitutional rights possessed by adults that should be ex-
tended to children as well, and rights deriving from the family
context that are particular to minors as such.1 67 Children's
rights theory, he argued, does not replace the best interest of the
child concept but expands and encompasses it.16s Unlike the
best interest of the child principle, which he refers to as an
"emotional-subjective" concept, the alternative of children's
rights provides decision makers with a "constitutional-norma-
tive" standard that ensures neutrality and recognition by the le-
gal system that the child is a party to the conflict with indepen-
dent interests and needs. 169
Justice Shamgar reiterated his distinction between funda-
mental constitutional rights of children and rights that children
164. Id. at 233.
165. Id. at 251-54.
166. Justice Shamgar uses the best interest of the child principle as his starting
point. Citing Professor Shifman, he points out that the best interest of the child princi-
ple is a paternalistic one that makes decisions for children rather than stating that there
is an obligation to listen to what children have to say or recognize their status as parties
to the conflict. When a conflict arises between parents, the best interest of the child
principle is appealed to as a supposedly "neutral" one that helps the court decide be-
tween legitimate competing claims. He says, further relying on Professor Shifman, that
the best interest of the child principle has its drawbacks. First, it fails to address the
tension between the interests of the actual child in question and the interests of the
potential child or children in general. Second, and here Shamgar's criticisms are more
relevant to the circumstances of the Ploni case, it fails to prevent ideological or subjec-
tive criteria from being introduced into the decision-making process. In a democratic
society, courts are supposed to remain neutral on substantive issues of religion and are
to remain utterly impartial in deciding between parents who disagree about the relig-
ious upbringing of their children. As Shamgar points out, the best interest of the child
principle makes it virtually impossible forjudges to remain impartial in conflicts regard-
ing religious education.
167. C.A. 2266/93, Ploni, Minor v. Ploni, (1995) 49(1) P.D. 221, at 255.
168. Id. at 254; see also RONEN, supra note 154, at 20.
169. C.A. 2266/93, Ploni, Minor v. Ploni, (1995) 49(1) P.D. 221, at 254.
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have within the family, arguing that with regard to the second
category, the children's rights discourse may not be appropriate
at all, and that courts will have to define precisely which interests
within the family can be described as "rights. "170
Where does Justice Shamgar's approach to children's rights
lie with regard to the distinctions outlined above, between
welfarist and interest-oriented theories on the one hand, and
liberationist and liberal oriented theories on the other? Justice
Shamgar introduced the concept of children's rights as a means
of ensuring impartiality in the decisions of the court. He held
that courts are required to state the correct balance between the
wishes and interests of the parents, the child, and the State.
However, he made it very difficult for readers of his legal verdict
to determine what he meant when he used the term "rights." He
referred in passing to the diversity in children's rights ap-
proaches, but never developed his own particular theory of
rights. He preferred to state laconically that all rights theories in
essence recognize:
That the child has become an autonomous individual, no
longer a "possession" of his/her parents, and that he or she is
entitled to the protection of his/her basic constitutional
rights, both from their violation by the state and from their
violation by his parents. 171
It is important to be aware of the gap between the terminol-
ogy and the essence. The rhetoric of Justice Shamgar in the
Ploni case is individualistic-liberal. Justice Shamgar used the
term "autonomous." However, it would appear from his later
analysis that he embraced, in fact, a paternalistic interest-theory
of rights that views the rights discourse primarily as a means of
isolating and protecting the minor's interests, as defined by the
court, and ensuring that he or she is treated as the subject,
rather than the object, of others. This is why Justice Shamgar
presented the paternalistic best interest of the child principle as
inherently bound up with the children's rights discourse, and
while he wished to recognize children as possessing constitu-
170. Id. at 255-56.
171. Id. at 252, 254. There,Justice Shamgar explains that those who adhere to the
doctrine of children's rights hold that: "The child is an autonomous human being. He
or she has rights and interests that are independent and separate from the rights and
interests of his/her parents."
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tional rights, he could see no use for children's rights theory in
custody disputes.
The whole notion of children having a "right" to be taught
their parents' religious beliefs rings strange in the ears of liberal
rights theorists, and the notion of this "right" limiting the child's
own right to choose his/her religious or non-religious education
rings even stranger. Only if children's rights are understood in
terms of interests defined externally to the minor, does this ap-
proach make sense. A rights theory that emphasizes autonomy
cannot tolerate such a rigid and externally defined account of
children's rights. For liberal rights theorists, it is precisely in dis-
putes concerning education or custody, where objective interests
are difficult to define, that children's rights theory can make all
the difference. 17 2 Children's rights, for liberal theorists, do not
mean defining and protecting the interests of children. They
mean listening to what children have to say and, as far as possi-
ble, allowing them to make their own decisions.
The point of departure of Justice Shamgar is paternalistic.
Justice Shamgar wrote:
The goal of this type of discussion is the granting of defense
to a child from choices which are in contradiction to his/her
best interest or rights. The point of departure is the assump-
tion that the minor cannot decide independently concerning
various matters, and therefore his/her parents decide con-
cerning these matters, and at times, concerning a dispute be-
tween the minor and his/her parents-the court decides.
The parents and the court, when they choose between pos-
sibilities and decide which is preferable, are guided by the
principle of the best interest of the child. Best interest of the
child is the goal but not necessarily the criterion or the mech-
anism of decision-making. The approach of children's rights
does not favor the 'rights' of the child over his 'Best interest'
• . . The purpose is not the development of a mechanism
which infringes upon the rights of parents and narrows the
autonomy of the family.173
172. See, e.g., John Eekelaar, The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The Role
of Dynamic Self-Determinism, 8 INTERNAT'LJ.L. & FAM. 42 (1994).
173. C.A. 2266/93, Ploni, Minor v. Ploni, (1995) 49(1) P.D. 221 (author's trans.).
Justice Shamgar held that sometimes the court will not enhance the child's rights when
the violation of those rights is insignificant. This policy was the result of the balance
between the insignificant violation of the rights of the child and the possibility of grave
damage to the family.
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Justice Shamgar pointed out that sometimes children are
unable to make their own intelligent decisions. 1 74 However, he
did not state that autonomy of children should be limited only
in situations thatjustify this limitation. In addition to devaluing
autonomy, Justice Shamgar's approach also devalues equality.
Instead of attempting to justify in coherent terms the use of ra-
tional capacity as a distinguishing factor between children Sham-
gar simply assumed that. the general category "children" could
be treated in a paternalistic manner. He did not apply, in the
Ploni case, Feinberg's distinctions between strong and weak pa-
ternalism, or Dworkin's distinctions between critical and voli-
tional autonomy. Even if Justice Shamgar assumes that rational
capacity should not be a relevant factor when a court determines
the scope of an individual's religious freedom, 175 some thought
should have been given in this case to a subjective factor: the
rational capacities possessed by the specific children at issue.17 6
Rights approaches that devalue autonomy can do little to
remedy the indeterminacy and subjective nature of the best in-
terest of the child principle. The same subjective criterion that
is usually implemented when a court applies the best interest of
the child standard is merely transferred to a different stage of
the decision-making process-the stage of defining which of the
child's interests are to be granted the status of rights.
The above decision of Justice Shamgar was the minority de-
cision concerning the status of children's rights in Israel in the
Ploni case. Justice Strasborg-Cohen, while utilizing a different
theoretical framework for her decision, reached the very same
result as Justice Shamgar. Although she acknowledged the im-
portance of granting autonomy to children and recognizing the
status of children as rights holders, and admitting that rights dis-
course can in part remedy the indeterminacy and subjective na-
ture of the best interest of the child principle, Strasborg-Cohen
concluded that the idea of children's rights should be one of the
174. Id. at 256-57.
175. An assumption that should, at the very least, require justification.
176. Interestingly, Justice Shamgar was not aware of the development in the arti-
cles written by Professor Eekelaar concerning children's rights. He relied heavily on
Eekelaar, supra note 17. Unlike Eekelaar's later article, discussed above, which clearly
advocates a will-theory and emphasizes the importance of autonomy in children's
rights, Eekelaar's earlier article avoids confronting the issue of whether autonomy
should be recognized as part of the "deep structure" of rights, preferring to adopt a
theory that defines and recognizes various interests as rights for children.
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considerations when the courts decide the fate of children.
However, this should not be the primary consideration. The
main consideration is the best interest of the child. Therefore,
she held that disputes regarding religious education should not
be decided on the basis of the principle of children's rights. In
this case, and other cases concerning the fate of children, the
final test must always be the child's best interests. She held that
in this case it was ineffectual to speak in terms of rights.177 Her
general conclusion, as well as the conclusions of most of the jus-
tices in the Ploni case, was that the principle of best interest of
the child should remain the leading principle in legal decisions
on the fate of children, and should be considered preferable to
the principle of children's rights.
The philosophical basis of the viewpoint of Justice Stras-
borg-Cohen is vague. One possible interpretation of the rheto-
ric is as follows. While Justice Shamgar can be viewed as a sort of
interest theorist, who attempts to tailor his rights approach to
what he sees as the special needs of children, Strasborg-Cohen
can be seen as a welfarist who rejects rights rhetoric in the con-
text of children. To some extentJustice Shamgar's approach re-
sembles Justice Strasborg-Cohen's. One uses rights theory, the
other the best interest of the child principle, but both are basi-
cally committed to the ideology of welfarists.
Three other justices also expressed their point of view con-
cerning the relationship between the best interest of the child
principle and the new principle, namely children's rights. They
preferred not to focus upon the differences between these prin-
ciples. They held that there are similarities between the princi-
ples of the best interest of children and their rights.
Justice Zamir held that the paths of the best interest of the
child and children's rights lead to the same goal: the essence is
important and not the terminology. He did not address the is-
sue of paternalism. Justice Zamir held that when the best inter-
est principle leads to a different result than that of the principle
of children's rights, the best interest principle prevails. When
the rights granted to the child are harmful to the child, the
court should prefer his/her interests. The principle of best in-
terests is known and accepted. It is also a principle mentioned
by the Israeli legislator in Section 17 of the Capacity Law con-
177. C.A. 2266/93, Ploni, Minor v. Ploni, (1995) 49(1) P.D. 221, at 266-68.
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cerning the relationship between parents and children. Pater-
nalism is preferred when the two principles, paternalism and au-
tonomy, do not coincide.
Justice Orr shared the position of Justice Strasborg-Cohen
and Justice Zamir, that the best interest of the child principle
should be granted more weight than the principle of children's
rights when there is a clash between the two.
Justice Matza held that the best interest principle and the
principle of children's rights are equally important. Sometimes,
when there is a clash between them, the court should prefer the
outlook of the latter principle. He held that some sections of
Israeli Law concerning children reflect a preference of the prin-
ciple of children's rights and others reflect a preference for the
best interest of the child.
The majority view in this case was conservative and paternal-
istic. However, the debate among the judges in this case, and
the discussion and explanations concerning children's rights,
sharpened the awareness of jurists in Israel to a new legal per-
spective, which grants minors the legal status of an independent
party in disputes concerning them, and more autonomy.17 This
was one small step in a new direction, not a revolutionary
change. Even the minority justice, Shamgar, did not speak in a
clear, decisive voice in favor of the adoption of the doctrine of
children's rights. He had his own doubts and reservations. It is
not clear whether Justice Shamgar held that a minor is granted
certain rights, such as participation in the process of decision-
making regarding his/her medical treatment.
Justices Dorner and Cheshin continued the paternalistic
policy concerning children's rights in the Plonit case.17 9 Their
terminology was that of autonomy and/or children's rights.
However, their view was that the essence of the relationship be-
tween parents and their minor children is paternalistic.
The son of Plonit was adopted by a loving and devoted fam-
ily. Eventually his mother requested that her son be returned to
her custody. Psychologists held that the transfer of the child
from his adopting parents to his biological mother would cause
178. Id. "The general aim is the strengthening of the status of the child. There is
great importance in strengthening of the status of the child in family disputes, although
to an extent, this process is only declarative and educational."
179. See A.C.A. 7015/94, Attorney General v. Plonit, (1996) 50(1) P.D. 48.
THE RIGHT OF A MINOR IN ISRAEL
irreversible harm. Justices Dorner and Cheshin held that the
child should remain in the custody of his adopting parents.
Justice Dorner used the terminology "rights" and "interests
of the child," and tried to define the criterion in regard to
proper balance between that right of the child and the right of
the natural parent to raise his/her child. She granted priority to
the right of every child to be raised in an environment that
would enhance his/her physical and emotional needs, which
would ensure his/her proper development. She mentioned Ar-
ticles 3 and 12 of the Convention. Article 3(1) states: "In all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative institutions, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration." '  Article 12(1) states:
"States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child."1 8 1
Justice Dorner did not distinguish children's rights from the
best interest of the child. She wrote:
The superiority of the right of the child has been expressed
in Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, which states that the
best interest of the child is a primary consideration. Section
S 1(b) of this law states: 'An adoption order and any other deci-
sion under this law shall be made if the court is satisfied that
they are in the interest of the adoptee. '182
She wrote that the aim of adoption is the realization of the supe-
rior right of the child, and quoted from the decision of Justice
Netanyahu, who wrote: "The child and his/her best interest are
the main consideration.' 3
Justice Cheshin was not sure that there was a substantial dis-
pute between the Justices in the abovementioned Ploni, minor
case. l84 He held that perhaps the differences of opinion be-
tween the Justices were merely differences in terminology and
180. Convention, supra note 15, art. 3.
181. Id. art. 12. See also Case 7015/94, Attorney General v. Plonit, (1996) 50(1)
P.D. 48, at 65-67.
182. Case 7015/94, Attorney General v. Plonit, (1996) 50(1) P.D. 48, at 66.
183. Id. at 67.
184. Id. at 94
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not of essence. He held that there is a basic assumption that
every person has interests, wishes, and a will. The legal system
grants some interests the status of protected interests, and then
these interests are "rights." '1 8 5
Justice Cheshin wrote that children should be granted
rights, and the individual should decide about his/her welfare:
His/her welfare is his/her will, and his/her will is his/her
welfare. 186 The concept of interest-in contrast to welfare-
emphasizes the right of the minor in his/her relationship
with his/her parents and the surrounding world, and at the
same time weakens the paternalism which is embedded in the
concept 'welfare' . . . When we speak about 'interest' of a mi-
nor we treat him as a human being, and we emphasize the
independent status of the minor as a bearer of legal rights
and interests... The status of the minor as a bearer of rights
and as an independent legal personality will strengthen them.
We shall refrain from (the old habit of) putting on the robe
of the patriarch who enhances the welfare of his subjects. We
shall fulfill our obligation to contest with the rights of the
minor. There will be the right of the mother and father on
one hand and the ight of the minor on the other hand. 18 7
However, Justice Cheshin held that the aformentioned
"rights" are implemented in a paternalistic manner. He wrote:
What should be the legal rule concerning a minor, a small
human being that could have rights but his will and discre-
tion are not fully developed? ...
In these circumstances we shall implement the good and
constructive paternalism of the legal system, and we shall say:
In principle we are willing to acknowledge the validity of the
idea that the will of an individual reflects his/her interest,
and we shall grant this will-interest (that the legal system is
willing to recognize) the protection of 'right'. This shall be
the policy concerning an adult. However, regarding a minor,
we shall pay attention to the extent of his ability to decide in a
mature manner about the relevant specific matter ... When
the minor is not able to express his own mature will, we shall
create his 'will', we shall act on behalf of the minor. In order
to protect this constructive will-a will we will ascribe to the
minor, a will that is not a [real, subjective] will [of the mi-
185. Id. at 94-95.
186. Id. at 96 (author's trans.).
187. Id. at 131-32 (author's trans.).
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nor] -we shall grant him [or her] a right. How will we create
this 'will'? The basis shall be the minor's best interest. The
'best interest' of the minor is raw material that is the basis of
our creation of a right or lack of a right of the minor ... The
best interest of the minor is the interest of the minor ...
When society and its legal system hold that a minor is not
mature enough to express his/her own will, we shall express
his/her 'will'. The basis of this 'will' shall be our conviction
regarding his/her best interest. This best interest is an ex-
pression of the minor's best interest. We shall use the title
'best interest' of the minor when we will want to describe the
'interest of the minor'.188
This is a paternalistic point of view concerning the rights of
a minor. He or she is not mature enough. Therefore, others
decide what is "his/her will," in the minor's best interest. "The
good and constructive paternalism of the legal system" prevails.
Justice Cheshin wrote again, in a similar manner, in the con-
sequent David case, ' 89 concerning a dispute between parents
whether their son's education should be religious or non-relig-
ious. He held that the primary consideration in such disputes,
in regard to the fate of children, is the best interest of the child.
He explained that some judges and scholars preferred the terms
"interests" or "right" of the minor, rather than the term his/her
"best interest." However, he held that the circumstances in this
specific case did not require his decision in the dispute between
the Justices in the Ploni, minor case.
In the David case, Justice Cheshin used the words "right"
and "best interest" of children, or "children's interests" and "best
interest" as synonyms although the terminology in one para-
graph of this decision is that of rights: "The issue is the right of
the child-his/her independent right-not the right of his par-
ents or someone who wants to enhance the child's best interests.
Sometimes the right of the child is superior to the rights of his/
her parents."190 The best interest of the minor was the primary
consideration in Justice Cheshin's decision. The paternalistic
trend concerning the fate of children prevailed.
These decisions of the Supreme Court lead to the same con-
188. Id. at 96-97 (author's trans.).
189. Bagatz 5227/97, David v. High Rabbinical Court et al., (2001) 55(1) P.D. 453-
190. Id. at 461 (author's trans.).
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clusion: the basic paternalistic point of view regarding the fate
of children prevails. When Justices use the terminology "rights"
of children they mean that adults decide what are their best in-
terests. However, these verdicts of the Justices enhanced the
awareness of the legal community of the concept "children's
rights."
III. THE DESIRED LEGAL SITUATION
Is the current legal situation desirable? The Israeli legisla-
tor granted minors a few rights only in certain areas. We wish to
suggest that the general policy should change. In every decision
which concerns minors, especially important decisions involving
medical treatment, that are sometimes decisions regarding to
matters of life and death, minors should be granted more auton-
omy. There should be an all-inclusive obligation to incorporate
minors in these decisions, in the spirit of Article 12 of the Con-
vention, which at least should serve as a source of interpretative
inspiration.'91 In addition, the current legal rules concerning
capacity should change. The legislator should rely upon con-
temporary empirical and psychological findings of scientific re-
search relating to children's abilities to participate in the deci-
sion-making process at various ages.19 2
Before extensively discussing the desired legal situation as
we see it, we would like to summarize some of the psychological
theories and empirical findings on this matter.
A. Empirical Findings and the Psychological Basis: Studies on the
Level of Decision-Making Capacity Among Minors
One social approach, which is reflected in the rules of vari-
ous legal systems, is paternalistic. The legislation in these legal
systems holds that minors are in general incompetent and there-
191. In the case of C.A. 3077/90, Plonit v. Ploni, (1997) 49(2) P.D. 578, at 593
(1997),Justice Cheshin relied upon the Convention as an interpretive source with re-
spect to conferring rights to minors.
192. Concerning the application of research on children's capacities in the field of
legal doctrine and legislation, see J.L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues
in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 226 (1996).
See S.B. Billick et al., A Clinical Study of Competency in Child Psychiatric Inpatients, 26J. AM.
ACAD. OF PSYCH. & L. 587, 592 (1998); C.C. Peterson & M. Siegal, Cognitive Development
and the Competence to Consent to Medical and Psychotherapeutic Treatment, in CHILDREN'S
UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND HEALTH 257 (1999).
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fore cannot supply informed consent, which is based upon a ra-
tional and coherent process of decision making.
Empirical research, however, suggests that even young chil-
dren, ages twelve to fourteen, can usually participate in a mean-
ingful and rational manner in decision-making about their medi-
cal treatment.1 9
3
Justice Douglas wrote that a consensus exists among child
psychologists that the emotional and intellectual maturity of
fourteen-year old adolescents is approximate to that of adults. 94
This theory is grounded in psychological studies.' 95 Piaget
researched adolescence from the viewpoint of human intellec-
tual development, and proposed that the adolescence consists of
four stages. Every child undergoes all stages in chronological or-
der, yet the specific age at which every child reaches each respec-
tive stage varies.96 The third stage, that of concrete thinking, is
followed by the fourth stage, of formal thinking, at which the
adolescent reaches the height of his/her intellectual develop-
ment and the vestiges of the limitations of the prior stages disap-
pear: his/her thinking becomes more logical and systematic,
and he or she become capable of a high level of abstraction.
The child is considered to possess a "thought lever," namely he
or she is able to construct in his/her imagination sketches of
possible outcomes that stem from his/her decisions, to mentally
explore various speculations, and to plan for the future. At this
stage, according to this theory, the thinking process of adoles-
cents is identical to that of adults. When he or she reaches this
fourth stage, the teenager is at the height of his/her intellectual
abilities.
193. Redding, supra note 14, at 708-09, 727.
194. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 246 (1972). Regarding the question
whetherJustice Douglas' characterization of children's capacities can withstand empiri-
cal scrutiny, see N.D. Reppucci & C.A. Crosby, Law, Psychology and Children: Overarching
Issues, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 7 (1993).
195. See Jean Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, in ADOLESCENCE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 122 (G. Caplan & S. Lebovici eds., 1969); Lois A. Wei-
thorn & David G. Scherer, Children's Involvement in Research Participation Decisions: Psycho-
logical Considerations, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS AND LAw 133
(Michael A. Gordin & Leonard H. Glantz eds., 1994); Billick et al., supra note 192, at
592; C.C. Peterson & M. Siegal, Becoming Mindful of Biology and Health: An Introduction,
in CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND HEALTH 1, 4-6 (1999).
196. For a summary of children's abilities at various ages according to Piagetian
approach, see Thomas Grisso & L. Vierling, Minor's Consent to Treatment: A Developmental
Perspective, 9 Prof. Psychol. 412 (1978).
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This psychological theory, concerning the four stages,
should lead Israeli and other legislators to a reassessment of ex-
isting rules which set one objective age of majority, such as eigh-
teen years in Israeli law, as the age of full legal capacity.
Additionally, many studies have investigated the assumption
that all minors are not competent to make decisions about their
own medical treatment. Researchers generally did not support
such a conclusion. These studies cast doubt on the justification
of the current Israeli law, which regards eighteen years as the
age of full capacity to consent to medical treatment. The follow-
ing is a brief summary.
Weithorn and Campbell conducted a study on minors and
adults ages nine, fourteen, eighteen, and twenty-one years.197
The subjects were presented with several hypothetical medical
dilemmas and were required to decide which medical treatment
was most appropriate. Generally, the fourteen year-old subjects
exhibited the same level of competency as adults. This result was
based upon four standards used by the researchers to measure
competence for proper decision-making: (1) evidence of
choice; (2) reasonable outcome of choice; (3) reasonable deci-
sion-making process; and (4) understanding.
The youngest subjects, the nine-year olds, were generally
less capable of making decisions about medical treatment. They
displayed difficulty primarily in forming a rational and logical
process of decision-making, although they showed ability to un-
derstand what was required of them when asked to choose from
a list of options. Hence, the results attest that even minors as
young as nine are able to participate meaningfully in medical de-
cisions concerning themselves, although their competence is not
sufficiently developed to an extent that could justify granting
them personal autonomy in decision-making.198
Another case study, conducted by Scherer, investigated the
decision-making capabilities of people ages ten, fifteen, and
197. See Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982). See also Lois
A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare: Guidelines for Pro-
fessionals, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 28, at 235. See also
Michael A. Grodin & Joel J. Alpert, Informed Consent and Pediatric Care, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 28, at 93.
198. For criticism on this study, see P.A. King, Treatment and Minors: Issues not In-
volving Lifesaving Treatment,' 23 J. FAM. L. 241 (1984-85).
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twenty-two, namely, groups of pre-adolescents, adolescents, and
adults. The study also sought to investigate the degree of influ-
ence of varying degrees of parental pressure on the subjects
when they are required to make decisions and the effect of the
pressure on their level of confidence about the decision. The
subjects were asked to choose among medical options (withhold-
ing treatment was one) and their long-range ramifications, re-
garding three hypothetical medical conditions: tonsillitis, re-
moval of a blister, and kidney donation. The subjects were rated
by their choice and the level of confidence exhibited in their
argument for it in each of these situations: (1) without parental
influence; (2) with coercive parental influence; and (3) with
non-coercive parental influence.
The results were as follows. In regard to two of the three
medical conditions, no significant differences were found be-
tween decisions of adolescents (fifteen year-olds) and of adults
(twenty-two year-olds). In the third condition differences were
discovered when non-coercive parental pressure was applied.199
Yet no differences resulted when there was no parental pressure
at all, or when there was coercive parental pressure.
With regard to the pre-adolescents group, this study re-
vealed that only in one medical condition-the kidney dona-
tion-was a substantive difference found between them and the
adults, yet this was true only when parental pressure was exerted.
In all three conditions no essential difference was discovered
among the various age groups when no parental influence was
exerted.200
A different study investigated the capacity for rational deci-
sion-making of children ages five to twelve who had free access
to the medical facilities in their elementary school, namely a situ-
ation of decision-making without adult supervision. The study
also investigated whether the very inclusion of this group of chil-
dren in the process of. decision-making positively influenced
their general outlook and behavior regarding medical treat-
199. This concerned the tonsillitis operation, i.e., non-lifesaving medical treat-
ment, and in this case the adolescents were more inclined to adhere to the dictates of
their own opinion and not succumb to the will of their parents.
200. Concerning the capacities of minors that are 14-15 years old to exercise vol-
untariness in medical treatment decisions and the influence of parents on their minor
children, see David Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 431, 431-49 (1991).
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ment. The subjects were granted wide leeway in choosing the
appropriate medical treatment needed to remedy their disor-
ders, except in matters that created a concrete risk to their
health, such as high fever or deep wounds. The results were that
the children speedily learned the rules of the system, and their
rate of usage of medical facilities was comparable to that of
adults. For example, the ratio between the sexes was maintained
(women use medical treatment at a higher rate than men, but
when children at these ages are brought in by an adult for medi-
cal treatment, the ratio between the sexes is inverse: boys are
taken to the doctor more often than girls). Hence, the findings
of the research were that the children in the study were ready
and able to take personal responsibility for their health. Moreo-
ver, involvement in the process of decision-making was shown to
increase the subjects' own awareness of personal responsibility.
Some scholars claim that imposing personal responsibility exerts
a positive influence and sharpens the abilities required for deci-
sion-making in other areas.2 °1
However, the study also showed that the subjects' pattern of
behavior regarding the medical facilities system remained unal-
tered. Children who previously had made excessive use of the
health system continued to do so. A background check of these
subjects highlighted abnormal behavioral patterns in all aspects
of daily life. The essential importance of this study lies in the
finding that children and adults, of similar socio-economic back-
grounds, tend to act in similar patterns of behavior. As stated,
the accessibility of medical services (without adult supervision)
for children ages five to twelve was similar to that for adults of
the same socio-economic groups.
There are important psychological differences between
early adolescents and adults20 2 that probably have implications
in the sphere of judgment. Therefore, distinction must be
drawn between older and younger adolescents. 20 3 A survey of
the existing scientific literature conducted by Lawrence Stein-
berg and Elizabeth Cauffman supports the notion that the differ-
201. C.E. Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT, supra note 28, at 75-91.
202. Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity ofJudgfment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAw & HUM. BEtAV. 249, 253-54
(1996).
203. Id. at 268.
THE RIGHT OF A MINOR IN ISRAEL
ences between older adolescents and younger adolescents are
more prominent than the differences between older adolescents
and adults. Other studies, focusing upon the ability to make de-
cisions independently, prove that while peer group pressure
clearly increases in early adolescence, both peer group pressure
and parental influence diminish during the high school years.
Older adolescents exercise more independent judgment than
younger adolescents. However, studies that establish this distinc-
tion between younger and older adolescents do not usually com-
pare older adolescents to younger adults.2 °4
Steinberg and Cauffman conclude that there is significant
evidence of a difference between the group of early and middle
adolescents in the sphere of decision-making. Their policy con-
clusion is: "there would appear to be a scientific basis within the
psychological literature on adolescent development for distin-
guishing under the law between individuals who have, versus
[those who] have not, reached the age of seventeen." 20 5
The researchers Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard stated re-
garding current developmental theory and results of research:
"Developmental theory and empirical research demonstrate that
by mid-adolescence minors are indistinguishable from adults in
their decision making. Their capacity for reasoning and under-
standing is similar to that of adults, and thus, they meet adult's
standards of legal competence under informed consent doc-
trine. 2 0 6
Scholars explain that research leads to the following conclu-
sions:
1. There is a little evidence that minors of age fifteen and
above as a group are any less competent to provide con-
sent than are adults.
204. See Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cog-
nitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J.
65, 99 (1999).
205. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 202, at 267-69. See also Beschle, supra note
204, at 100.
206. E.F. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Context, 19 L. &
HUM. BEnAV. 221, 221-22 (1995). The authors also state: "Adolescents pose a dilemma
for legal policymaker. Traditionally they have been classified with younger children as
minors .... Some observers have argued that they should be given more of the rights
and privileges accorded to adults." Id.; see also Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Re-
sponse to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 233
(1996).
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2. In the age range of eleven to fourteen years, existing re-
search suggests caution regarding any assumptions about
these minors' abilities to consider intelligently the com-
plexities of treatment alternatives, risks and benefits, or to
provide consent that is voluntary.
3. Most research suggests that minors below age eleven gen-
erally do not have the intellectual abilities or are too prone
to deferent response to satisfy a psychological interpreta-
tion of the legal standard for competent consent.
4. In the formation of legal and ethical policy regarding con-
sent by minors, psychological competence is but one cir-
cumstance that must be weighed.
Other circumstances should be: the liability of parents re-
garding their children's behaviors, the accountability of pro-
fessionals in the process of informing children about treat-
ments and risks, the fact that different treatment situations
may vary in complexity ... and the degree to which various
treatments are likely to be essential to the well-being of the
child, and more.
20 7
Scholars suggest:
A. There may be no circumstances that would justify sanc-
tioning independent consent by minors less than eleven
years of age, given the developmental psychological evi-
dence for their diminished psychological capacities.
B. There appear to be no psychological grounds for main-
taining the general legal assumption that minors at age
fifteen and above can not provide competent consent.
C. Ages eleven to fourteen appear to be the transition period
in the development of important cognitive abilities and
perceptions of social expectations, but there may be some
circumstances that would justify the sanction of indepen-
dent consent by these minors for limited purposes, espe-
cially when competence can be demonstrated in individ-
ual cases.208
The findings of studies provide an important empirical basis
for our theoretical conclusion and our practical recommenda-
tion. Several additional points favor the inclusion of the group
of mature minors in the decision-making process on their own
medical treatment:
207. T. Grisso & L. Vierling, supra note 196, at 412-27.
208. Id.
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1. When minors are granted the authority to seek treatment
independently for medical problems that are liable to
place them in an uncomfortable position or to cause
problems with their parents (e.g., treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases), they will be inclined to receive the
necessary treatment. This runs counter to the possible al-
ternative: a paternalistic legal situation, on account of
which minors are likely to opt not to seek treatment for
these conditions in order to avoid possible conflict with
their parents.
20 9
2. Many experts claim that granting minors greater control
in medical issues is likely to elicit positive responses (physi-
cal and emotional) to medical treatment, since this facili-
tates the child's willingness to cooperate.
2 10
3. Imparting greater responsibility to minors for their medi-
cal treatment and other matters trains them properly for
the future task of assuming responsibility for themselves in
their adult lives.
21 1
However, proponents of granting children rights, as well as
researchers, admit that there are shortcomings in these studies.
Several inherent problems arise from the manner and condi-
tions in which these experiments were' performed, and some
hold that these could minimize the reliability of the results. 2
The shortcomings are as follows.
1. In the majority of these studies, the child subjects were
Caucasian, and members of the upper-middle class. The
conclusions may relate only to children belonging to cer-
tain socio-economic classes, and do not reflect a cross-sec-
tion of society,21 3 especially since some experts posit that
children of different socio-economic and ethnic groups
209. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 64
(1982); Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 1] OSGOODE
HALL L.J 115, 124 (1973).
210. See G.B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benfits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 28, at 2140; D.E. Putnam et al., Com-
mitment Improves Adherence to a Medical Regimen, 62J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 191-
94 (1994); Redding, supra note 14, at 708; McCabe, supra note 79.
211. See Redding, supra note 14, at 709.
212. See Scherer, supra note 200, at 431; Weitorn & Campbell, supra note 197, at
1589; see also G.B. Melton, Children's Concepts of Their Rights, 9J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCH.
186 (1980); King, supra note 198, at 254.
213. See Scherer, supra note 200, at 44546; Weitorn & S.B. Campbell, supra note
197, at 1596; M.J. Dolgin et al., Caregivers'Perceptions of Medical Compliance in Adolescents
with Cancer, 7J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 22, 25-26 (1986).
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mature at different rates of development. 214 In the United
States, for instance, minorities are indicated to mature at a
slower pace, and this can perhaps be attributed to their
lower economic status or their minority status. Children
from minority groups are expected to be slower in their
conception of how to exercise their legal rights.
2 15
2. Some studies indicate that adolescents attribute great im-
portance to the aesthetic side effects of medical treatment.
For example, many teenagers are concerned that certain
medication may cause excessive hair growth or other visi-
ble side effects, so they take a lower dosage. Adults assign
far less importance to such aesthetic side effects;216
3. Adolescents are more likely to respond to external effect.
Their fellow adolescents are their role model. Minors are
more impulsive than adults. They tend to be more influ-
enced by moods. The strong tendency of teenagers to take
part in high-risk activities does not originate from rational
thinking, but is a result of a cognitive tendency, that proba-
bly disappears with age. These facts lead to question
marks regarding the ability of minors to participate in the
process of decision-making, especially concerning critical
decisions; 2
1 7
4. In several of these studies, the subjects were presented
with hypothetical medical conditions; this greatly differs
from a situation of real, painful illness, which is generally
accompanied by symptoms of stress and fear that are liable
to alter the behavior and decision-making of individuals of
different ages;218 and
5. The ramifications of allowing decision-making are unclear,
in that inter alia these decisions are a product of economic
ability with regard to an individual who is not financially
independent. To affect his/her decision, he or she must
rely upon others. The effects on the family and parents of
granting children authority in the sphere of decision-mak-
ing, when at the same time they are financially dependent,
have been insufficiently probed. 219 By granting children
214. See Melton, supra note 212, at 186-90; Scott et al., supra note 206, at 226.
215. See Melton, supra note 212, at 186.
216. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 197, at 1596.
217. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 202, at 253-54; E.P. Mulvey & F.L. Peeples,
Are Disturbed and Normal Adolescents Equally Competent to Make Decision About Mental Health
Treatments?, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 273 (1996).
218. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 197, at 1596; Scherer, supra note 200, at
445-46; Woolard, supra note 206, at 226.
219. See Scherer, supra note 200, at 446.
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the right of decision-making, parents are stripped of pow-
ers concerning their family. Parents may view this loss as a
challenge to their authority as protectors of the family
unit, hence when health insurance does not cover all the
medical expenses, their assumed commitment to finance
medical treatment may wrongly be taken for granted.
These shortcomings should be taken into consideration when
children are granted the right to participate in the decision-mak-
ing process concerning their treatment. This right should be
limited when the aesthetic side effects of medical treatment are
evident or when there are significant medical expenses that are
not covered by national and/or health insurance.
B. Models for Including Children in Decisions Concerning Their
Medical Treatment
At the first stage, the Israeli law that regulated the legal rela-
tionship between parents and their minor children-the Capac-
ity Law, 5722-1962 22 0-reflected the conservative, paternalistic,
approach. According to this law, minors, as a whole, are statuto-
rily banned from executing independent legal actions.
Section 3 of the Capacity Law establishes the age of legal
capacity as eighteen years. 22 ' A number of specific results derive
from this limitation on the legal capacity of minors, namely their
incapacity to act in an independent manner. They cannot be
parties that obligate themselves and benefit from binding con-
tracts or perform many other legal actions. Consent to undergo
medical treatment is one of these legal acts. The legal definition
of a minor is relevant, inter alia, with regard to the inclusion, or
perhaps non-inclusion, of the minor in the decision-making pro-
cess concerning the administering of medical treatment affect-
ing him or her.
Nevertheless, the legislator is not consistent with this legal
definition, in Section 3 of the Capacity Law. Upon examining
various laws dealing with the established minimum age which en-
titles minors to be involved in the decision-making process in
matters affecting them, one at once discovers that the age estab-
lished by the legislator is not always eighteen. The law concern-
ing adoption of children distinguish between children above
220. Capacity Law, supra note 25.
221. Id. § 3.
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and under nine years.2 22 The law regarding religious conversion
of a minor grants due weight to the view of a minor that is "ten
years age or over."223
Perhaps, concerning consent to. medical treatment, the Is-
raeli legislator could establish a new legal rule which takes into
consideration the ability of each minor to comprehend and ana-
lyze the pros and cons of medical treatment in a rational man-
ner.
In Israel, several specific laws exist, inter alia, regarding the
age of legal competency to assume obligations and rights. These
legal rules grant rights and impose obligations upon children
that are younger than the general competency age in Israel. Ac-
cording to Section 12 of the Penal Law 5737-1977, a child is held
criminally culpable for criminal behavior from age twelve. Mi-
nors above age twelve may be tried for crimes and be sentenced
to punishment, except for imprisonment.224 The age at which a
female adolescent may wed is seventeen,225 and a female minor
is entitled to receive a judicial authorization to marry at age six-
teen.2 2 6 With regard to a male adolescent there is no age limit
with respect to marriage. The minimal age for consensual sex-
ual relations with a male or female minor is fourteen according
to Section 345(a) and Section 347(b) of the Israeli Penal Law.
222. For example, as Section 7 of the Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, supra
note 68, at 360, establishes that:
If the adoptee has reached age nine, or if he had not yet reached age nine, but
is capable of understanding the matter, then the Court shall make an adop-
tion order only after it is satisfied that the adoptee wants that adopter to adopt
him.
223. As abovementioned, with regard to the conversion of a minor to another re-
ligion, Section 13A of the Capacity Law establishes that:
The religion of the minor shall not be changed unless both his parents have
given their written consent in advance or the Court, on the application of one
of the parents or of the guardian of the minor, has given prior approval to the
change of religion.
If the minor has completed his tenth year, his religion shall not be
changed unless, in addition to the consent of his parents or the approval of
the Court under subsection (a), he, too, has given his prior written consent.
See also M. Shawa, Legal Questions Regarding Change of Religion in the Area of Matters of
Personal Status, 4 TEL Aviv UNIV. L. REv. 302, 306-08 (1974-75).
224. Penal Law, 5737-1977, 34(f) (Isr.); Youth (Trial; Punishment and Models of
Treatment) Law, 5731-1971, supra note 72, § 10: Imprisonment may be decreed if at
the time of sentencing the minor was already fourteen years old.
225. Marriage Age Law, 5710-1950, 4 L.S.I, § 1 (Isr.).
226. Id. at § 5.
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Additional exceptions are contained in Section 316(b) of the Pe-
nal Law, which establishes that the consent of a minor to termi-
nate her pregnancy does not require the consent of her guard-
ian, and Section 8(c) of the Adoption of Children Law, 5741-
1981 establishes that the consent of a minor to submit her child
for adoption does not necessitate the consent of her parents.
Additionally, the Israeli Ministry of Justice is currently draft-
ing a bill that will grant minors from age twelve the authority to
consent to various treatments, among them various medical
treatments, for example, psychotherapy, pregnancy prevention,
and treatments for sexual assault.
The Author has reached the conclusion that the current le-
gal rules and doctrines in Israel and other countries that share
the view of the Israeli legislator that minors, as a whole, are
banned from executing many independent legal actions, are not
desirable from an ideological viewpoint, and do not even faith-
fully reflect the status of the child, and especially the adolescent,
in society and within his/her family, as a partner in the decision-
making process concerning his/her activities and life. The fol-
lowing suggestions focus on involving minors, especially adoles-
cents (teenagers), in making medical decisions concerning
them, and are limited to medical procedures that are not emer-
gency or life-saving, since we hold that paternalism is justified in
regard to emergency or life-saving medical treatment. 227 How-
227. Justice Agranat, in the Gerty case, and Justice Beiski, in the Cortam case, held
that a minor should not be granted the right to make his/her own decision to receive
or not to receive medical treatment, when doctors hold that this medical treatment is
necessary in order to save the minor's life. See C.C. 527, 480/85, supra note 85, at 696-
98.
Justice Elon, in the Shefer case, and Justice Beiski, in the Cortam case, emphasized
the fact that in Judaism, the sanctity of life is a very important value. Justice Zusman
held, in the Eli case, that the claim that the State should "leave the citizen alone," and
not intervene when he or she chooses to risk his/her life or act in an impossible man-
ner, that could cause him or her bodily harm, is unacceptable. See Bagatz 332/71, M.
Eli et al., v. Minister of Transportation et al., 26(1) P.D. 105, 112 (1972). We share his
point of view that paternalism is justified in certain circumstances. The minor should
not be granted the fight to decide to endanger his/her life or choose to die. Consent
of a minor to such an act might be considered as uninformed and coerced, as Dworkin
wrote: "If it was plainly not in my self-interest [to have consented] this might suggest,
though it does not prove, that my consent was either uninformed or coerced." Ronald
Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 574 (1980); RONALD DWORIN, A MAT-
TER OF PRINCIPLE 276 (1985).
Sometimes consent to medical treatment is not based upon rational considera-
tions. Desperate patients are willing to try a very dangerous treatment. In these circum-
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ever, in other aspects of medical treatment concerning children
they should be granted more autonomy. In suitable circum-
stances, they should be granted the right to speak for them-
selves.
228
The involvement of children in essential decisions is likely
to be beneficial for them. The child perceives his/her involve-
ment as an honorable expression of his/her independence and
privacy. The child perceives himself or herself as an active part-
ner in decisions concerning himself/herself. This will probably
contribute to his/her self-confidence and intellectual matur-
ity.22
9
Some experts argue that non-inclusion of children and ado-
lescents in decisions concerning themselves is liable to increase
depression, cases of suicide, and anti-social behavior among
them, while increasing their involvement should curb these
manifestations. 230 Additionally, experience in making decisions
(even if they are few in number) constitutes the first steps on the
path of garnering life experience, which is a major characteristic
of "maturity." It is unjust to claim that society may deny a person
the exercise of free will solely because he or she may err in judg-
ment. This view may lead adults to being barred from making
decisions on new experiences when they lack the necessary tools
to choose properly. 231
Three models come to mind for including children in medi-
cal decisions that are not emergency or life-saving decisions.
1. Determination by the legislator that the minor's opinion
must be considered.
2. Lowering the statutory age of capacity with regard to the
execution of legal acts.
3. Granting the minor the possibility of proving that he or
she possesses the same true capability for decision-making
as that of an adult concerning certain legal actions (or re-
garding all legal actions).
stances, the request of the patient to endanger himself or herself should not be
honored. See Bagatz 30/82, Maayan et al. v. Director General of the Ministry of Health,
(1982) 36(2) P.D. 477-82.
228. See Grisso & Vierling, supra note 196, at 412, 424.
229. Children who are given decision-making responsibility mature in their ability
to make decisions; while those who are sheltered from such responsibilities develop
habits of "acting-out" behavior. See Melton, supra note 28, at 21, 27-28.
230. See Weithorn, supra note 197, at 245.
231. Id.
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1. Statutory Obligation to Consider Minors' Opinion
The first model recognizes that the minor is a natural part-
ner in decision-making about his/her affairs. In the daily lives of
children, the external element of control (primarily, by parents)
is dominant. However, life experience indicates that within the
family unit children considerably influence their parents and
family life, and they do express their opinions and participate in
the process of family decision-making. Israeli law and law in
many other countries lags far behind the prevalent reality, and
for the most part does not recognize the child's right to play a
significant part in the decision-making process. It must be
stressed that consequently, at present, in these legal systems, mi-
nor children do not bear responsibility for the consequences of
the decisions in which they have participated.
In Israel, the basic legal framework, especially in the Capac-
ity Law, is paternalistic. Until now, in Israel, the authority of par-
ents over their minor children has been restricted only in spe-
cific matters.. In those matters a statutory restriction has been
established. Those matters include child matrimony,23 2 compul-
sory education,233 and severe deprivation.234 In recent years,
these special areas have been expanded to cover certain new spe-
cific matters, concerning minors, such as detection of the AIDS
virus, 23 5 psychiatric examination and treatment, and more.
236
How could the minor enhance his/her autonomy in a new
legal framework? One possibility is a more radical change. The
special cases should become the general' rule. According to this
point of view there should be a general statutory obligation to
take into consideration the minor's wishes in every issue that
concerns him or her.
In the United States, judicial decisions have been rendered
in which the presiding judges established that the child's con-
sent concerning his/her medical treatment must play a signifi-
cant role in the decision-making process. In the Green case, the
232. Marriage Age Law, supra note 225, § 5, 5 (a).
233. See Capacity Law, supra note 25, § 15; Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949,
3 L.S.I. 125.
234. See Capacity Law, supra note 25, §§ 15, 17; Youth (Care and Supervision) Law,
5720-1960, supra note 72, 2 L.S.I 44,; Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 323 (Isr.).
235. Detection of HIV in Minors Law, 5756-1996, 49 L.S.I. 252, § 1 (Isr.).
236. Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 5720-1960, 14 L.S.I. 44, supra 72, § 3(G)
(Isr.).
2002] 1155
1156 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1085
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the opinion of a fif-
teen-year old boy must be taken into account concerning the
treatment of his non-life-threatening medical condition.23 v In
the Sampson case, a New York court dissented from this Penn-
sylvania judgment, ruling that the opinion of a fifteen-year old
boy regarding a non-emergency medical procedure was not re-
quired and was deemed non-relevant. 218 In this case, the court
refused to take the approach of the court in the Seiferth case,
which preceded it by fifteen years. In Seiferth, it was ruled that a
great deal of weight must be attached to the preference of a
fourteen-year old boy concerning the performance of a non-
emergency operation since the treatment following the opera-
tion demanded the child's full cooperation. 239
The policy of judges, who hold that a child should be a full
partner in decisions concerning his/her medical treatment, and
perhaps in all matters concerning his/her fate, could be the new
policy that should result in a necessary amendment of legislation
in Israel and in other countries.
2. Lowering the Age of Capacity
The ideological basis of the model of lowering the age of
capacity lies in the argument that no rational reason justifies the
arbitrary establishment of one age for legal competency in each
and every matter. Although adolescents are presumably not suf-
ficiently mature to make decisions which affect society, and thus
receive the right to vote in Israel only from age eighteen, one
should not infer that they cannot make competent decisions on
some other matters, such as their own medical treatment. Our
claim is that if solid scientific research proves that minors from a
certain age are capable of making certain decisions, they should
be empowered with this very right. In the field of medical treat-
ment the age of capacity should be established in light of the
abovementioned research concerning the ability of children and
adults to participate in a meaningful manner in the process of
decision-making concerning their medical treatment.
The results that stem from the application of this model
might not lead to the non-inclusion of parents in the medical
237. See In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
238. See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
239. See In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955).
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decisions concerning their children. Scherer's research indi-
cates that the degree of influence of parents' opinions on their
children's decisions is highly significant at all ages. Their par-
ents' opinion influenced the decisions of fifteen-year old young-
sters and twenty-two year old adults to almost the same degree.
Therefore, the legislator should not distinguish between fifteen-
year old and twenty-two year old human beings in the field of
consent to medical treatment. The assumption is that the major-
ity of medical decisions made by minors will inevitably be jointly
made with parental input. Parental involvement will also cer-
tainly be expressed through payment for medical treatment or
insurance, while the child exercises his/her right to make medi-
cal decisions on his/her own behalf.
From this and other studies one can conclude that generally
children who have reached the age of fourteen (some claim
twelve) possess the necessary skills and level of maturity that en-
able them to make decisions about their own medical treatment
that are rational and reasonable to the same extent, or almost
the same extent, as the decisions of adults. 240
Fourteen is generally acknowledged as the age when most
children can participate in decision-making on medical treat-
ment. An alternative is the age of fifteen. The general presump-
tion is that children aged fifteen and older are capable of provid-
ing informed consent.2 4' These presumptions should be the ba-
sis of legislation in the sphere of the age of capacity to make
decisions concerning medical treatment.
Perhaps some would claim that this conclusion appears to
be too radical. However, these studies require us to question the
basic assumption of the Israeli legislator and many other mod-
ern legal systems that fourteen or fifteen-year old children are
not capable of making decisions concerning their bodies and
lives.
240. A common criticism in relation to the psychological studies is that they were
largely conducted with reference to middle-class populations, and so applying these
findings to other socio-economic populations is problematic, since they may be slower
in their mental and moral reasoning development. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra
note 197, at 1596.
241. See Thomas Grisso, Juvenile's Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1160-66 (1980); Redding, supra note 14, at 726, 735.
Concerning the capacity of minors that are 14-15 years old in the field of decision-
making, see David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescent's Capacities to Provide
Voluntary Informed Consent, 12 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 123 (1998).
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The lowering of the age of capacity, in the sphere of con-
sent to medical treatment, could be more radical. From the
findings of some scholars we could conclude that the age of legal
competency to decide upon or to accept medical treatment
should be lowered to ages twelve or thirteen.242
It should also be noted thatJewish law is one of the sources
of inspiration when the Israeli Ministry ofJustice drafts new laws.
Jewish law recognizes the concept of the developing stages of
competency. At the age of twelve the female child is bestowed
with complete legal competence; this occurs at the age of thir-
teen for the male child. However, at a younger age, the child is
also sometimes presumed competent, although to a limited de-
gree. An ancient Jewish Text, the'.Talmud, expresses the
method of determining this legal competence with the phrase:
"everyone according to his degree of sharpness."243 Every minor
is treated according to his/her level of intellectual maturity.
This criterion is applicable in certain individual cases, and
should not be applied as a broad, absolute rule.
We hold that it is sufficient to lower the age of competence
to consent to medical treatment to fifteen. However, the legisla-
tor should apply the same rule for adolescents and adults,
namely that the presumed competency of any individual could
not be sufficient as a result of judicial reassessment. The court
could decide that a specific individual is not legally capable of
making reasonable decisions. This approach grants the minor
rights as opposed to patronization. The child who is fifteen years
old should not be required to take legal action and petition the
courts in order to actualize his/her rights.2 44
Those who wish to advance this approach want to bestow
upon the minor the concrete right to make medical decisions
concerning him or her, without the need to seek approval of
his/her request in Court. The minor is not required to expose
himself or herself in court and his/her problems (and perhaps
242. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 96-97 (1932); B.M. Korsch
et al., Noncompliance in Children with Renal Transplants, 61 PEDIATRIC 872, 873 (1978); 0.
Nakajima & M. Hotta, A Development Study of Cognitive Processes in Decision Making: Infor-
mation Searching as a Function of Task Complexity, 64 PSYCOL. REp. 67, 77 (1989); WallaceJ.
Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1873, 1881-83 (1996).
243. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketuboth 60A; Gitin, 59A.
244. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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also the disagreement on this matter with his/her parents)245
An additional detriment of the method which obligates minors
to enter into the judicial arena in order to achieve the right of
making decisions concerning their medical treatment is the fact
that essentially the court substitutes the paternalistic role of the
parent as the one who decides on the minor's behalf, so this
does not manifest the granting of rights that are readily made
available to minors. Moreover, the court does not necessarily
possess the proper means for rendering judgment of whether
the minor is sufficiently mature or what weight should be attrib-
uted to his/her opinions.
This model can be perceived as a more complex and mod-
erate version of the child liberation doctrine, which strives for
the emancipation of all human beings of all ages.24 6 It is similar,
to an extent, to the model of Article 12 of the Convention: "The
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the Child." 24 7 It adopts one of the two com-
ponents in the latter model: "the age."
The application of this approach can be demonstrated
through various provisions of Scottish law. In Scotland, a minor
is defined as such when he or she is under age eighteen.24" How-
ever, specific laws grant minors a right to make major decisions
concerning their lives at the age of sixteen. From age sixteen, a
minor may get married,249 terminate his/her formal studies,25 °
work full time, 251 and leave the home of his family. 25 2 All these
245..In the Bellotti case, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of
the minor, in certain situations, to decide concerning medical treatment. This right is
independent and separate from the right of his/her parents to participate in the deci-
sion-making process. See id. at 643, 648, 654. However, the Court also established that
the method of exercising this right should only be through appearing before the
courts. Every minor should have the opportunity to go directly to court without first
consulting or notifying his/her parents. The constitutional right to have an abortion
(which was established in this case) affords protection of privacy interests. Id. at 655.
246. See DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 664-667 (1994); HOWARD
COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 42-55(1980) (arguing that children should have
same rights as adults); THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Bob Franklin ed., 1986); Farson, supra
note 30, at 9.
247. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12(1).
248. Age of Majority Act 1969, § 1(1) (Scot.).
249. Marriage Act 1977, § 1 (Scot.).
250. Education Act 1980, §§ 30-31 (Scot.).
251. Children and Young Persons Act 1937, §§ 28-31 (Scot.).
252. Elaine E. Sutherland, The Role of Children in the Making of Decisions Which Affect
Them, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 156.
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acts are independent. The minor is not required to seek paren-
tal consent.253 Additionally, court orders regarding child cus-
tody are valid only until age sixteen.254
With regard to decisions concerning medical treatment,
Scottish law establishes an internal division within minority:
"pupils" are girls up to age twelve and boys up to age fourteen,
and "minors" are young people from these ages until age eigh-
teen.255 Until recently, minors were granted the right to agree
or to refuse to medical treatment.256 However, in the last few
years, following clarifications by the Scottish Ministry of Health,
the right to agree or to refuse medical treatment is granted to
those ages sixteen and up.257
In the United States, legislation exists in certain states that
lowers the age of legal competency concerning decision-making
in specific situations: pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases,
and drug and alcohol addiction.5 8
As mentioned above, there were special exceptions in Israel
to the rule in regard to age of legal capacity. Perhaps the Israeli
legislator could consider granting this authority of independent
decision-making to all minors concerning medical treatment in
general, after the minor reaches the age of fifteen or sixteen
years.
3. Enabling the Minor to Prove Competency
The basic presumption of the model of enabling the minor
to prove competency is that minors younger than eighteen gen-
erally have not attained complete intellectual maturity, and lack
the necessary competence for making sound decisions concern-
ing medical treatment on their own behalf. However, under this
model, the minor will be entitled to challenge this presumption
and be allowed to prove in court, or to a professional expert,
253. Id.
254. Law Reform (Parent and Child) Act 1986, § 3(2) (Scot.).
255. Sutherland, supra note 252, at 156.
256. Id. at 160.
257. Id.
258. See American Academy of Pediatrics-Committee on Pediatric Emergency
Medicine, Consent for Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, 92 PEDIATRICS 290, 290-
91 (1993); Abigail English, Legal Aspects of Care, in TEXTBOOK OF ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
(Elizabeth R. McAnarney et al. eds., 1992); Abigail English, Runaway and Street Youth of
Risk for HIV Infection: Legal and Ethical Issues in Access to Care, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
504-10 (1991).
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that he or she possesses that legal competence. The minor will
be required to demonstrate intellectual maturity, independence,
and the capability of making decisions and bearing their conse-
quences. The outcome of recognizing the minor's competence
is likely to be expressed in granting the minor autonomy to de-
cide upon the specific matter concerning him or her (e.g., re-
fusal to undergo a certain operation); autonomy within a limited
range of decisions (e.g., concerning his/her medical well-be-
ing); or in certain situations the minor is to be empowered with
full autonomy.
The shortcomings of this model have, been discussed above.
We shall briefly enumerate a few: the minor's loss of privacy; the
need to seek judicial recognition through the courts as to level
of maturity; the lack of financial capability to petition the courts
for a right which the minor already possesses; and the toll of this
entire ordeal in the sphere of the minor's relationship with his/
her parents.
In the United States this model has already been adopted in
a number of states. In Bellotti v. Baird,2". the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized a distinction between mature and immature
minors, in the matter of restricting the ability to consent or not
consent to undergo abortions. In the case of Younts v. St. Francis
Hospital,26 ° parental consent for a medical procedure to be per-
formed on a seventeen-year old minor could not be obtained.
The court ruled that under the specific circumstances a seven-
teen-year old minor was sufficiently matire to comprehend the
options and ramifications of her decision to agree to the medical
treatment: "The sufficiency of a minor's consent depends upon
his ability to understand and to comprehend the nature of the
surgical procedure, the risks involved and the probability of at-
taining the desired results in the light of the circumstances. '261
In the state of Illinois, rights have been granted to the "Ma-
ture Minor."
Where the minor is at least sixteen years of age... a 'mature
minor' who has demonstrated the ability and capacity to man-
age his/her own affairs and live wholly or partially indepen-
259. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648-49 (1979).
260. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing Inc., 492 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970).
261. Id. at 300. See w.j. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal
Framework, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 60, supra note 28.
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dent of his/her parents, may petition the court to obtain the
legal status of an emancipated person.2 6 2
When a minor has proven his/her maturity to the court, he or
she receives full emancipation concerning all aspects of life.
In the state of Nevada, minors are given the opportunity to
make their own decisions concerning medical treatment if they
have lived apart from their parents for a period longer than four
months. When the minor lives with his/her parents, parental
consent is not required when the minor: "understands the na-
ture and purpose of the proposed examination or treatment and
its ... probable outcome and voluntarily requests it."'2 6 3
Additionally, the American Bar Association has established a
series of standards intended to provide direction and to serve as
a model for state legislation. It recommended that the Ameri-
can legislator and courts grant recognition to the "Mature Mi-
nor" doctrine.2 6 4 Under this doctrine, a minor over the age of
sixteen, who has sufficient capability to comprehend the nature
and the consequences of the proposed medical treatment, may
express his/her consent to the procedure, and his/her consent
shall be considered as binding.265
The American Academy of Pediatricians recommended that
in addition to the consent of the minor's parents, a minor who
has reached the age of thirteen years should grant his/her con-
sent to surgery or medical treatment. 266 The Academy also rec-
ommended that the participation in medical research of a minor
who has reached the age of seven will be permitted only after he
or she has received a verbal explanation regarding the research
procedure to be performed upon him/her and has consented to
the application of such a procedure upon him/her. The deci-
sion of the minor to end his/her participation in the research
should always be honored.
In any event, according to this recommendation, the doc-
tor's decision as to the ability of the minor to decide in a mature
262. Estate of Johnson v. Johnson, 673 N.E.2d 386, 393 (111. 1996).
263. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 129.030(2) (1993).
264. American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Center, Juvenile Justice Standards
Project, Rights of Minors 4.6A.
265. See id.; WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD-THE PROBLEM OF PROXY CONSENT 69
(Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds., 1982).
266. Lainie Friedman Ross, Health Care Decision-Making by Children: Is it in Their Best
Interest? 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41, 42 (1997).
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manner, should be based on individual factors, such as the mi-
nor's exact age, the specific illness and its severity, the possible
risk of treatment, and its expected medical potential. The doc-
tor should assess the extent of intelligence
. 
ability, of rational
thinking, and the emotional state of the minor concerned. He
or she should be guided by his/her professional experience re-
garding treatment of minors, and the history of treatment of the
minor in regard to decisions concerning medical treatment.2
67
The rules and suggestions in American law and of American
groups regarding a mature or understanding minor require clar-
ification. We suggest that our recommendation in regard to the
exact criterion that determines maturity and understanding, and
especially that based upon psychological theories and empirical
research findings on consent to medical treatment, should be
the basis of any criteria, regarding proof of maturity, which en-
ables a minor to consent to medical treatment.
Another option is the adoption of the model in England. In
England, in Section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969,
the British legislator stated as follows:
The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen
years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in
the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his per-
son, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age,
and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effec-
tive consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to ob-
tain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.268
However, the age of sixteen years, is not the only criterion.
The case of Gillick269 serves as a monumental turning point in
English law in terms of the balance between children's auton-
omy and parental powers. The rule handed down in the Gillick
case establishes that a minor that is less than the age of sixteen
acquires the ability to execute legal actions if he or she is deter-
mined as being of appropriate intellectual maturity. 270 This is
267. See Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Informed Con-
sent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314-17 (1995).
268. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c. 46 § 8(1) (Eng.). For the legal environment
in England after the 1969 reform, see J. MONTGOMERY, HEALTH CARE LAw (1997).
269. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1985] 3 All E.R.
402 (HL) (1985) (UK).
270. In the Gillick case the court ruled concerning a 15-year old minor. Her
mother requested that she should not receive pills for prevention of pregnancy. The
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ascertained through a concrete examination based upon the fac-
tual evidence of the specific situation that may be administered
by the court. The majority opinion ruled that the rights of the
parent over his/her child end at the very moment that the child
is deemed competent to make decisions in this area. Even the
dissenting opinion, that of Lord Templeton, argued with the ma-
jority opinion only with regard to the specific issue addressed in
the case (usage of birth control pills). Templeton held in princi-
ple that it was legitimate for a doctor to rely upon the minor's
consent concerning other medical procedures (e.g., the removal
of tonsils).
The scholar Michael Freeman claims 271 that the importance
of this case lies in heightening public awareness to the topic of
the recognition of children's rights; furthermore, this case had a
decisive impact upon the enactment of the Children Act, 1989.
However, it is not readily apparent that from the Gillick case one
may infer any conclusion concerning the rights of minors to
agree to all medical treatment at all ages.
The scholarJohn Eekelaar held that the fact that the major-
ity in the Gillick case ruled in favor of the minor was an indica-
tion of the current new trend to enable children to realize rights
that will grant them autonomy. However, although the majority
in the House of the Lords held that the extent of understanding
of the minor is a relevant factor concerning the granting of the
right of decision-making to minors with respect to their medical
treatment, this case does not offer any clear and obvious criteria
for determining a minor's level of maturity and understanding.
Perhaps the suggestions regarding such criteria in this Arti-
cle, based upon findings of solid research, could be imple-
House of Lords ruled that the child's parents could not prevent the granting of the pills
despite the age of the child. The legal subjection of a minor to his/her parent exists
only until he or she is able to care for his/her matters. The age of the minor, an
objective criterion, is not a decisive factor, when the subjective legal capacity of the
minor is determined. The relevant factor is his/her ability to be of settled mind and to
reach full understanding of what is suggested to him or her, its results, and dangers.
This ability can exist in a minor although he/she has not yet reached the age of 16
years.
271. See Freeman-Limits of Children's Rights, supra note 34, at 40. Professor Eeke-
laar explains that once the court has decided whether the child has sufficient capacity,
the child's decision should determine the matter, whether or not the court thinks this is
for his best interest. See John Eekelaar, The Eclipse of Parental Rights, 102 L.Q. REv. 4, 8
(1986).
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mented regarding minors in England, as well as in Israel and in
other countries.
We are aware of the fact that five years later, in the re R2 7 2
case, this legal doctrine was limited and restricted. According to
the new doctrine of the re R case, a minor under the age of six-
teen can consent to medical treatment without the consent of
his/her parents, in certain circumstances. However, concerning
the refusal of a minor to consent to medical treatment, the mi-
nor's parents have a veto power. We suggest that the policy in
this case should not be the general rule. The ruling of the Lords
in the Gillick case is coherent. However, in the re R case there is
a lack of satisfactory explanation of a distinction between con-
sent of a minor to medical treatment and his/her refusal to be
treated. If the relevant criterion is the ability of a minor to com-
prehend the matter, in the above-mentioned manner, the dis-
tinction of the re R case is problematic. The minor's under-
standing is the important factor, not his/her acceptance or re-
jection of medical treatment.273
The trend of granting mature and understanding minors
certain rights of decision-making concerning their medical treat-
ment should be the main model adopted in Israeli law. It is in
the spirit of Article 12 of the Convention: "in accordance with
the age and maturity of the child. 274
4. Establishing a Minimum Age
In the cases outlined above that applied one of the above-
mentioned models, at times a minimum age was established, and
minors younger than that age were barred of the opportunity to
prove their competency. 275 It may be argued that the purpose of
establishing a minimum age stems from practical interests, in or-
der to rule out baseless claims that the very young minor is ma-
272. [1991] 4 All E.R. 177 (UK).
273. It seems that a narrow interpretation of the right of the minor in Section 8 of
the Family Law Reform Act, 1969, concerning children led the court to this reform.
This section includes the words "who has attained the age of sixteen years." The court
in the re R case felt it should take these words into consideration, and therefore limited
the right of the minor under this age to reject medical treatment.
274. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12(1) (emphasis added).
275. The mature minor doctrine, the age of 15 in the Gillick case, the age of 16 in
the Scottish law. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tenn. 1987). The court
held that between the ages of 14 and 18, a "presumption of capacity" arises. That pre-
sumption can be rebutted by evidence of incapacity.
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ture enough and able to understand the pros and cons of his/
her medical treatment. A similar principle was adopted in Arti-
cle 12 of the Convention: "in accordance with the age and matur-
ity of the child. 27
6
Accordingly, we would like to suggest that only after a child
reaches a minimal age, which will be determined by the legisla-
tor that takes into consideration the theories of developmental
psychology and results of empirical research, will he or she be
able to prove his/her level of maturity and understanding.
277
C. Additional Considerations
1. Different Categories of Medical Treatment
Another criterion for determining whether a minor can par-
ticipate in the process of decision-making concerning his/her
medical treatment is the criterion of the category of medical
treatment. 278 This parameter should be implemented in addi-
tion to the above guidelines. The combination of the specifica-
tions we mentioned concerning the minor, his/her personality,
maturity, and understanding, etc., with the type of medical treat-
ment, could lead to the proper verdict. We have already sug-
gested that minors should not be granted the right to decide
concerning emergency or life-saving treatment. Perhaps they
should not be allowed to decide when there are significant aes-
thetic side effects to medical treatment.2 79
In the United States, state legislatures have also established
exceptions unrelated to the common law pattern, many of which
focus on specific diseases, conditions, or treatments. The most
common of these statutory exceptions, now found almost univer-
sally, allows treatment of a minor for venereal disease without
parental consent.2 0
Professor Redding justifies this policy:
Although the terms competence and capacity are sometimes
used interchangeably, capacity is a legal term of art which is
used to denote competence to consent to a particular treat-
276. Convention, supra note 15, art. 12(1).
277. See Billick et al., supra note 192, at 592.
278. See Redding, supra note 14, at 728-39.
279. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 197, at 1596.
280. Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25 How. L.J. 525,
531 (1982).
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ment... Thus the term "capacity" will be used in the context
of children's ability to provide informed consent to a specific
treatment.
28 1
Distinctions between consent of minors to different types of
medical treatment are prevalent in American caselaw.28 2
In Israel, it may be inferred from a number of statutory pro-
visions that they enable medical treatment without the patient's
consent in particular circumstances. 28 1 Justice Bach held that in
Israel, the exemption to the rule that a person rules his own
body, and a person may not be treated physically, let alone oper-
ated on, without his consent, will tend to be broader than the
exemption in the United States and in England, in part because
of the sanctity of human life in the eyes of Jewish Law. There is
also room to distinguish between a life-saving operation that may
severely and substantially alter-a person's physical appearance,
lifestyle, and quality of life (such as amputation or transplant)
and one that does not bear such risks and implication. The for-
mer should generally be left to the patient's decision and the
latter to the doctor's. 2
84
2. Financial Means
Perhaps a minor should not be granted the independent
right to consent to medical treatment that will incur substantial
financial expenses to his/her parents. 2 5
With regard to payment for medical care, when discussing
rights in ,general one must distinguish "rights" as liberties from
other legal rights, such as the right to sue (Hohfeld). When so-
ciety grants rights in the broadest sense, as in the case of the
right to demand legal action, not only will the actual right be
281. Redding, supra note 14, at 709.
282. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
See also Redding, supra note 14, at 717; Alexander Morgan Capron, The Competence of
Children as Self Deciders in Biomedical Intervention, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD?-THE
PROBLEM OF PROXY CONSENT, supra note 265, at 68.
283. Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version] 2 L.S.I. [New Version] 5, §24(8)
(Isr.); Military Justice Law, 1955, 9 L.S.I. 184, § 20(a) amended by 18 L.S.I. 140 (Isr.);
Prisons Regulations, 1978 (KT. No. 3882, at 1958), reg. 10 (Isr.).
284. See Case 527, 480/85, Cortam v. State of Israel, (1986), 40(3) P.D. 673, at 687-
88.
285. A number of states have statutes that "emancipate" minors for purposes of
consenting to medical care if they are living separate from their parents and managing
their own financial affairs, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12F (1996).
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bestowed, but the necessary means will be also provided. In gen-
eral terms, this concept of rights in the sense of the right to sue
requires a proper economic and organized infrastructure to en-
able minors to utilize them. The actualization of rights in the
sense of liberties is indeed contingent on the financial support
of parents and the health system in each given country.
CONCLUSION
The common point of view nowadays is that one should
grant the child as much autonomy as possible, and to prevent
paternalism when it is not necessary. We should consider the
opinions of Professor Dworkin and other scholars about pater-
nalism. The desirable aim, especially considering the fact that
Israeli law adopted the rules of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and Article 12 of the Convention, is to grant minors the
right to take part in the decision-making process regarding their
medical treatment, as much as possible. The right should be
granted in light of the doctrine of the developing capacity of the
minor in the Convention, that is based upon two parameters:
(1) the objective parameter-the age of the minor; and (2) the
subjective parameter-his/her level of understanding. In this
context, one should consider psychological theories and re-
search regarding the ability of minors, of the ages of twelve, four-
teen, and fifteen, to decide in a rational manner and consider all
the pros and cons regarding their medical treatment.
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